



Charles University in Prague 
Faculty of Social Sciences 







Corporate Governance Index for the Prague Stock 





Author: Tihana Ibrahimpašić  
Supervisor: Jana Chvalkovská, Ph.D.  





















Declaration of Authorship 
 
1. The author hereby declares that she compiled this thesis independently, using the listed 
resources and literature. 
2. The author also declares that this thesis has not been submitted for the award of any 
other academic degree or diploma. 
3. The author grants to Charles University permission to reproduce and to distribute copies 
of this thesis document in whole or in part. 
 































I would like to express sincere appreciation to my supervisor Jana Chvalkovská for continuous 
guidance and insightful suggestions.  
 
I am also grateful to Professor Mislav Ante Omazić from Faculty of Economics and Business, 
University of Zagreb, Mr. Jan Proházka, and Mr. Jan Kubik from Thomson Reuters for generous 
help with data collection. 
 
My gratitude is also conveyed to my family and to Alen, for their understanding and endless 































                                                             
1 Euroabstracts (2003) Mainstremaing Innovation. Published by the European Commission, Innovation 






This thesis primarily focuses on the construction of a firm-specific index measuring the quality 
of corporate governance in the most liquid Czech and Croatian companies. The index is made by 
following OECD recommendations on construction of composite indicators. It allows comparison 
of best practices implementation on the overall level, and it also provides with a comprehensive 
analogy in terms of various governance domains performance. These domains are represented 
by four sub-indices: Board, Conflict of Interest, Shareholders' Rights, and Transparency and 
Disclosure. Initial assumption, stating that the Czech companies should have higher overall 
Corporate Governance Index score than the Croatian companies, is approved. Moreover, the 
Czech companies have stronger performance in three sub-indices: Board, Conflict of Interest, 
and Transparency and Disclosure, whereas the Croatian companies have negligible advantage 
solely with regard to the Shareholders' Rights Sub-index. 
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The Corporate Governance Index will be constructed as a composite indicator according to OECD 
recommendations. Variables on fulfillment of certain best practices will be collected by the 
questionnaire and verified by the author to avoid missreporting. Then the process of index 
construction will include the following main steps: analysis of index consistency, weighting of sub-
indices, aggregation of the Corporate Governance Index. 
Prague Stock Exchange listed companies have higher level of governance practices implementation 




Firstly, the thesis will explain corporate governance development in both Czech and Croatian 
market in last two decades, which is necessary to understand the firm-level corporate governance, 
measured for the most liquid companies – Prague Stock Exchange companies whose stocks take part 
in the PX Index, and Zagreb Stock Exchange companies included in the CROBEX10 Index. The 
analysis will be based on the unique Corporate Governance Index, containing variables that refer 
principally to the OECD best practice recommendations. The main contribution of this thesis is the 
index itself, representing the composite indicator consisted of sub-indices covering practices in 
terms of: board structure and functioning, conflict of interest, shareholders’ rights, and transparency 
and disclosure. It will precisely point out the problematic areas and thus help companies create 
necessary changes to become more competitive.  
Corporate Governance Index for the Prague Stock Exchange and Zagreb Stock Exchange Listed 
Companies 
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Lately the importance of corporate governance has been magnified worldwide, especially due to 
proliferation of numerous scandals and crisis, namely cases like Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia 
Communications, Tyco International, Parmalat, Satyam Computer Services, etc. Due to 
globalisation and complexity of modern corporations, such failures had even more detrimental 
impact for public confidence in securities markets. The reaction to these major corporate and 
accounting scandals in the United States was embodied in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in 2002, with 
much stricter rules publically traded companies needed to comply with. This Act, as well as the 
other related American legislation, also influenced the European Union actions concerning this 
matter (Naciri, 2008). The European Commission's Action Plan: “Modernising Company Law and 
Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward” from 2003, 
is the key document on corporate governance in the European Union, while a number of 
directives, recommendations, regulations and studies to promote good corporate governance 
have been supplemented. Besides, a great number of national governance codes adhere to 
Principles of Corporate Governance issued by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). This document was delineated by OECD Ministers in 1999 and has 
become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other 
stakeholders around the world. Since then, there were couple of reviews which have been 
continuously upgrading main issues of corporate governance, thus representing distinguishable 
directive for institutional, legislative and regulatory initiatives in both OECD and non-OECD 
countries.  
 
Both countries comprised by this thesis, the Czech Republic and Croatia, have been obviously 
influenced by the European Union legislation, and in addition they also adhere to OECD 
guidelines. In this research the subject of interest is comparison of good corporate governance 
practices implementation on a firm-level. These practices are mainly extracted from OECD 
recommendations, but also other sources are taken into consideration. Moreover, the idea of this 
thesis is to tell a story on development of corporate governance in both countries, which will 
help to set the context for further firm-level examination. Both countries have had similar 
experiences since they underwent major political and economic changes that left tremendous 
impact on corporate governance setting. Nevertheless, it seems that the Czech Republic is few 
years ahead of Croatia in terms of development of governance mechanisms - an essential 




concept of the hypothesis tested is that the encompassed Czech companies should have higher 
level of governance practices implementation than the Croatian ones. Solely the most liquid 
companies in each country are analysed, since they are market makers and not only in trading, 
but might also be in terms of corporate governance.  
 
In order to measure a level of good governance practices implementation and to verify whether 
Czech companies perform better with regard to that, a composite indicator is made.  In fact, the 
main contribution of this thesis is construction of the comprehensive Corporate Governance 
Index. Unlike other measures of corporate governance commonly used in different research 
papers, this index captures all major aspects of corporate governance: board structure and 
functioning, conflict of interest, shareholders’ rights, and disclosure and transparency (which 
then represent separate sub-indices in the overall index). The most liquid companies, which take 
part in the PX Index of the Prague Stock Exchange and the CROBEX10 Index of the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange, are analysed in terms of the attributes related to corporate governance. The main 
instrument of data gathering is the Corporate Governance Questionnaire filled in directly by the 
companies, whereas independent evaluation of the resulting answers is conducted by the 
author, using information from various publicly available sources such as company websites, 
disclosure reports and stock exchange databases. The index is a weighted average of the scores 
given to the four sub-indices; the values range from zero to one hundred where higher scores 
indicate better governance practices implementation. Moreover, four various versions of the 
index are constructed, based on different weighting and aggregation techniques; the selection is 
then made by testing correlation of each index type to the alternative measure of corporate 
governance - the directors’ independence. 
 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 begins with description of definitions and importance 
of corporate governance for today’s economies. Then the detailed development of corporate 
governance is shown both for the Czech Republic and for Croatia, in order to get the broader 
understanding of the topic analysed. Also, other governance indices used in the literature are 
presented. Chapter 3 describes the main research interests of the author. Chapter 4 
systematically delineates methodology used – description of the samples and the process of the 
Corporate Governance Index construction. Chapter 5 provides with the summary statistics and 
the empirical results. Chapter 6 outlines the added value of the thesis and gives some ideas for 









Literature Review  
 
 
2.1. Definitions, Models and Importance of Corporate Governance 
 
 
2.1.1. Definitions of Corporate Governance  
 
The understanding of corporate governance is usually prone to diverse variations. Sir Adrian 
Cadbury in the Report on the Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance says that 
corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury, 
1992). Moreover, corporate governance is often identified as a pure concept of control. In that 
sense, it deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investment (Shleifer, Vishny, 1997). This definition can be extended to 
specify corporate governance as being concerned with the resolution of collective action 
problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between 
various corporate claimholders (Claessens, 2003). Such comprehension is classified in the 
domain of straightforward principal – agent problem, which is sometimes also referred to the 
division of ownership and control. Indeed, separation of ownership and control is where it all 
started from. The first studies on the system of corporate governance appeared in the 1930’s, 
based on the research on the value creating separation between shareholders and management 
undertaken by Berle and Means (1932). This scientific concern occurred during the decline of 
traditional family businesses, whose owners and managers were the same persons, being 
subsequently replaced by companies with dispersed capital ownership, in which there was a 
clear separation between ownership and control (Brezeanu, Stănculescu; 2008). Even Adam 
Smith criticised this corporate form of business: “…The directors of such (joint-stock) 
companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it 
cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which the partners in a private co-partnery frequently watch over their own… Negligence and 
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such 
a company. “ (Smith, 1776). So separation of ownership and control created substantial space for 
potential conflicts among various claimants. In order to clearly identify such corporate 
governance issues, it is necessary to understand different corporate governance models; one 




should keep in mind that, according to the different model, different conflicts may arise and they 
are hindered primarily through external or internal mechanisms of control.  
 
2.1.2. Models of Corporate Governance 
 
In essence, there are two conceptually different models of corporate governance: the 
shareholder and the stakeholder model.  
 
The shareholder model is more common for Anglo-Saxon countries, with well developed capital 
markets, which are the main source of firms' financing, and broadly dispersed ownership. The 
core conflict in such widely held system is between controlling managers and „outside“, widely 
dispersed shareholders, hence this model is also sometimes called „outsider model“ (Mejstrik, 
2005). Consequently, the role of corporate governance is to limit/eliminate opportunistic 
managerial behaviour, which often contributes to adoption of non-beneficial strategies for 
shareholders. This goal is set due to the fact that small shareholders are endangered since often 
they cannot sufficiently monitor management's actions because of coordination problems – the 
principal - agent problem. Although they express power through the election of the board of 
directors as their representative, another important mechanism is external monitoring in a 
sense of an active market for corporate control, the term first time brought by Henry Manne in 
1965. It is known to be an effective corporate governance mechanism (Jensen, 1993; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Scharfstein, 1988; Bebchuk, 2003). Thus, managers are strongly motivated to 
improve the performance because otherwise they will be sanctioned by hostile takeovers and 
loss of their positions. Moreover, an important element in shareholder protection is reliance on 
liquid and well functioning stock market, because it allows them to exit the firm cheaply. 
 
The stakeholder model is typical for the continental European countries such as Germany, The 
Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, etc. Ownership is concentrated among major investors. The 
median largest voting block values in the listed companies in the above mentioned countries 
exceed 50 percent, i.e. more than half of the companies are controlled by a majority owner 
(Barca, Becht; 2001). The owners of firms tend to have an enduring interest in a company and 
often they directly influence management; on top of that, they often hold positions on the board 
of directors or other senior managerial positions. Being powerful in the decision making 
process, major shareholders' interests are well protected due to existence of internal mechanism 
that mitigates conflicts of interest between management and shareholders, and it is represented 
through intense motives of major investors (shareholders) to monitor and/or eliminate poorly 
performing management (Franks, Mayer, Renneboog; 2001). Moreover, internal governance 




system concerns the interaction between or among firm insiders, specifically, management, 
directors and employees (Baber, Liang; 2008). Also, other groups (stakeholders) may exert 
substantial influence on some decisions of the company, such as employees, trade unions, firm-
specific buyers, public, etc. The advantage of monitoring by blockholders is that it is occurring on 
a continuous basis, unlike external monitoring which is more typical for crisis situations (Bolton, 
Von Thadden; 1998). Still many problems may occur, and namely existence of blockholders can 
be associated with opportunistic behaviour in relation to minority shareholders – the conflict 
between „inside“ controlling blockholders and „outside“ minority shareholders. Also, there is a 
possibility for a standard agency problem between managers and shareholders as described in 
the shareholder model.  
 










- diversification possibility 
- increased liquidity and lower costs 
  of equity 
 
 
- bigger power to efficiently 





- unaccountable boards exposed to 
  CEO who may have “visionary 
  projects” such as massive acquisition  
  undertakings 
- lack of monitoring at the 
   shareholder and the board level 
- free riding 
 
 
- unaccountable boards exposed to 
   influence of blockholders, 
   minority shareholders can be 
   damaged 
- lower liquidity and higher costs of 




- increase autonomy of the board by  
  engaging independent directors 
- improve voting system: proxy 
  voting, voting by mail/electronic 
  voting 
- separation of CEO and chairman of 
   the board 
- increase management liability 
- market for corporate control 
 
 
- minority shareholder protection: 
   cumulative voting, limits on the 
   voting power of blockholders, etc. 
 
 
Source: Becht (2003), Mejstrik (2005); adjusted by author 
 
There are some prominent papers, such as Lane (2003) or Hansmann and Kraakman (2001), 
stressing that global trend of convergence of the corporate governance systems towards Anglo-
American model has been occurring. One good example of above mentioned trend, according to 
some authors, may be document called Principles of Corporate Governance published by OECD, 




designed to assist countries in creating their own corporate governance codes, thus becoming a 
benchmark to countries on their way of reaching more developed level of corporate governance. 
For instance, Tricker (2010) claims that OECD guidelines actually reflect what was considered as 
a best practice in the United Kingdom and the United States, and as an illustration of that the 
author mentions a requirement demanding listed companies to have unitary boards, 
independent outside directors, and board committee, while the focus is on enhancing 
shareholder value. Tricker further claims that an Anglo-American approach to corporate 
governance became the basis for governance codes around the world. Still, this should be taken 
very cautiously. On the other hand, the worldwide convergence is not necessarily a 
straightforward exercise in practice due to the persistent differences in the world's corporate 
ownership structures and other specific reasons, even though some nations have recently 
embarked on a process of change in their corporate laws in the direction of the Anglo-Saxon 
American shareholder-oriented model, with a view of integrating better into international 
financial and product markets (Palmer, 2011). Moreover, there are signs that the commitment to 
social democracy will survive this experience in countries with a stakeholder-oriented business 
climate for a considerable period of time (if not for good) (Palmer, 2011). Still, unlike these two, 
some more compromising predictions exist. Assuming it is not imminent (if not impossible) that 
the consensus and worldwide convergence will emerge in the proximate future does not mean 
that corporate governance systems must be ever-conservative about learning from one another 
(Luo, 2007). Indeed, each system must transfer some efficient and compatible elements for use 
to another system, without destroying the equilibrium of the system itself (Luo, 2007). Thus, 
referring back to OECD guidelines, one should also notice that this document dedicates a whole 
chapter to stakeholders, meaning it is not fully based on the shareholder model. 
 
2.1.3. Importance of Corporate Governance and Extended Definitions 
 
When it comes to the importance of corporate governance, especially in present circumstances 
of proliferation of numerous scandals and crisis, and, up to certain extent, failures of the whole 
corporate governance systems, much larger recognition, a wider extent and a bigger framework 
have to be attributed to corporate governance (Cornell, Shapiro; 1987; OECD, 1999). With 
globalisation vastly increasing the scale of trade and the size and complexity of corporations and 
the bureaucracies constructed to attempt to control it, the importance of corporate governance 
has been even more amplified (Applied Corporate Governance website, 2009).  
 
In order to capture the role of corporate governance in modern economies, its purpose should 
be clearly defined. In brief it comprises the following: 




 to facilitate and stimulate the performance of corporations by creating and maintaining 
incentives that motivate corporate insiders to maximize firms’ operational efficiency, 
return on assets and long-term productivity growth; 
 to limit insiders’ abuse of power over corporate resources – whether such abuse takes 
the form of insiders’ asset stripping or otherwise siphoning off corporate resources for 
their private use, and/or their causing significant wastage of corporate-controlled 
resources (the so-called agency problems) – which are otherwise likely to result from 
insiders’ self serving behaviour; 
 to provide means to monitor managers’ behaviour to ensure corporate accountability 
and provide for reasonably cost-effective protection of investors’ and society’s interests 
vis-{-vis corporate insiders (Oman, Fries, Buiter; 2003). 
 
On the other hand, one should be aware that corporate governance is only part of the larger 
economic context in which firms operate, that includes, for example, macroeconomic policies 
and the degree of competition in the markets. Its framework also depends on the legal, 
regulatory and institutional climate. In addition, factors such as business ethics and corporate 
awareness of the environmental and societal interests of the communities in which a company 
operates can also have an impact on its reputation and its long-term success (OECD, 2004). 
Contemporary studies do not allow the concept of corporate governance to exist in the absence 
of an explicit reference to ethics and the stakeholder theory – the objective of a solid corporate 
governance framework should be maximisation of firms’ contribution to the overall economy, 
including all the stakeholders. In that sense, corporate governance implies the relationship 
between shareholders, creditors, and corporations; between financial markets, institutions, and 
corporations; and between employees and corporations. Modern theory goes beyond this and 
embraces additional stakeholders such as government, community, trade associations, etc. Also, 
a more generous concept of corporate responsibility and citizenship has come to encompass 
corporate governance and its constituencies, including such aspects as the dealings of the firm 
















The Czech Republic underwent major political and economic changes in the recent history, on its 
way from communist to the capitalist regime. The restructuring of the whole system began with 
the “Velvet Revolution" in 1989, which represented a step towards huge transformation that 
was about to come. The shock therapy, popularly called “Big Bang” by IMF, started in January 
1991 and it included sudden release of prices and currency controls, imposition of financial 
disposition, withdrawal of state subsidies and trade liberalisation, accompanied with the 
restructuring of property rights i.e. privatisation. Especially for the purposes of this thesis, 
privatisation is by far the most important; as the former Czech Minister of Privatisation once 
said: “Privatisation is not just one of the many items on the economic programme. It is the 
transformation itself” (cited in Nellis, 2002). Still, all the other substantial improvements 
attributed to the (trans)formation of corporate governance structures as well.  
 
 
2.2.1. Privatisation Process and Its Impact on Corporate Governance 
 
In 1989 the former Czechoslovakia had one of the smallest private sectors among the communist 
countries, employing about 1.2 percent of the labour force and producing only less than 1 
percent of GDP (Hanousek, Kočenda; 2003). However, the Czech privatisation programme that 
came off resulted in almost 75 percent of productive capacity being transferred to the private 
sector by the beginning of 1995. There were three major programmes of privatisation: property 
restitutions (returning assets to initial owners from whom it was nationalised by the communist 
regime after 1948), small-scale privatisation (subjects were small economic business units such 
as restaurants, shops and enterprises, sold at public auctions) and large-scale privatisation. The 
first two types started in 1990 and were in the focus during early years of the transition. The 
large scale privatisation was crucial for the corporate governance changes.  It started in 1991 
and it consisted of two waves. The most important method used was voucher privatisation. It 
was appointed at vast number of citizens, who bought voucher points that allowed them to take 
part in bidding for shares, and later to keep them or trade on the secondary market. There were 
expectations that voucher privatisation would create “an active capital market as in the United 
States”, while it was obvious that “individual citizens would have neither the capacity nor the 
incentive to provide any meaningful governance” (Fitzsimmons, 2002). Therefore, due to a 
concern of excessively dispersed and passive ownership, investment privatisation funds (IPFs) 
were introduced (World Bank, IMF, 2002). Each voucher holder had an option of assigning all or 
part of his points to one or more IPFs. As a result of considerable marketing campaigns by IPFs, 




many individuals offered them all or most of their points. Moreover, IPFs formulated fund 
groups and in such manner managed to gain significant market share, strengthening their 
market power. Of the shares offered through the voucher scheme, two-thirds ended up with IPFs 
and one-third with private individuals (Claessens, Djankov, Pohl; 1997). Thus, the Czech voucher 
scheme led to highly concentrated ownership.  
 






Source: Grosfeld, Hashi (2003) 
 
Although new corporate governance structure led to an increased profitability and market 
valuation of privatised companies (Claessens, Djankov; Pohl; 1997), too much proprietary 
involvement of IPFs had a bad influence on companies because profits were extracted from the 
them rather than being used for investment and eventual restructuring (Hanousek, Kočenda; 
2003). Besides, funds often created alliances and dominated the other fragmented owners – 
massive abuse of minority shareholders’ rights was quite common, despite couple of restrictions 
on IPFs’ maximum holdings. Another obstacle was that conflicts of interest were a very plausible 
possibility, because many funds were sponsored by commercial banks, and these banks were 
main creditors of the firms in which the funds invested (Coffee, 1996). Thus, banks practically 
had the biggest control. In addition, two secondary markets (the Prague Stock Exchange and 
alternative market called the RM-System) that were expected to work did not fulfil the 
predictions and roughly 80 percent of all shares were traded in large blocks “off-the-market” 
(Hanousek, Kočenda; 2003). Moreover, old problems, such as the fact that corporate sector was 
seriously distorted by the communist regime (weak microeconomic foundations of companies, 
administrative monopolies, soft budget constraints, market isolation from many other 
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economies, non-transparent book keeping, etc.) could not suddenly disappear (Kouba, 2004). 
Although the aggressive rhetoric used by the government hid a lack of institutional development 
(Grabbe, 2003), the mentioned problems (among which primarily concentration of share 
ownership and resulting growth of informal networks of insider ownership) led to market 
failures and contributed to the economic recession which hit the Czech Republic in 1997 
(Vliegenthart, Horn; 2005). Despite increased profitability of privatised firms, corporate 
governance mechanisms did not work. Thus, the qualitative privatisation could only be achieved 
by coming to grips with the corporate governance issues (Andreff; 1996). It became clear to 
policy-makers that it would be necessary to “reform the reform” (Dragneva, Simons; 2001).  
 
2.2.2. The pre-European Union Integration Period 
 
Further step is to observe how decision on integration into the European Union influenced 
corporate governance of the Czech Republic. Privatisation was accompanied by many problems, 
in the first place exploitation of minority shareholders rights, frauds, asset stripping, corruption, 
management entrenchment, etc. Corporate governance regulation had thus become an 
important issue in restructuring of the Czech economy in the context of the EU accession. The EU 
had a pivotal influence on corporate governance structures, by stimulating its institutional 
development, most importantly within Accession Treaties and the Acquis communautaire 
(accumulated legislation constituting the body of EU law) conditionality. In such manner the EU 
has shaped “the entire range of public policies” (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier; 2004) that needed 
to be followed in order to successfully become a member of the EU. Europeanization in the 
context of Central Eastern European corporate governance is as a process by which the EU 
exports models of market regulation, and it affects the relations between firms, the state, and 
trade unions (Grabbe, 2003). 
 
Knowing the biggest weaknesses of the system, numerous changes were introduced, and some 
of those are stated below. 
 
The Investment Fund Act (1998) caused transformation of closed-end funds into open-ended 
funds, and this process was intended to be completed by 2003. The Act also reduced the 
maximum holding of IPF in a single company from 20 to 11 percent (OECD, 1998).  
The amendment to the Banking Act (1998) prohibited banks from holding controlling stakes in 
companies other than banks, financial institutions and banking support companies (OECD, 
1998). Generally, the Czech banking sector was quite a concern of the EU.  There are some 
evidences that it had been left „intentionally non-privatised“ (Havrda, 2003). The Economist 




even called it „parochial and politicized“ (The Economist, 1997). The EU identified the financial 
sector as a „key weakness in the Czech Republic's accession efforts“ (The European Commission, 
1999).   
The Phare programme (1990-2000) had a role of improving the functioning of Czech capital 
markets (strengthening and liberalisation) and it provided advice, training and equipment to 
help institutions to more effectively fulfil their new role in the market economy. It also 
contributed with the Twinning programmes, where bureaucrats, accustomed to their own 
countries’ methods of working and assumptions about policies and policy-making processes, 
were advising on implementation within CEE governmental structures (Grabbe, 2003).  
The Czech Securities Commission (1998) is by far the most important institution with regard to 
corporate governance, as well as its central advocate. It was founded as an independent and 
professional authority, which would supervise the capital market in cooperation with the 
Ministry of Finance and the Czech National Bank. It significantly contributed to restoring 
investor confidence in financial markets.  
The most excessive Amendments to the Commercial Code (2001) are part of the process of 
harmonising Czech law with the European Union legislation.  Several other acts were brought, 
such as the Stock Exchange Act, the Bankruptcy and Composition Act and Listing Rules of the 
Prague Stock Exchange.  
The Corporate Governance Code (2001), issued by the Czech Securities Commission, is based 
on OECD Principles from 1999. It is a result of a working group engagement which consisted of 
members from the Prague Stock Exchange, the RM-System, the Associations of Banks, Insurers, 
Internal Audit and Pensions Funds, the Union of Accountants, the Czech Rating Agency, the 
Czech Institute of Directors, etc., and support from the British Know How Fund. The main 
objectives were to achieve the best practice on transparency and accountability for companies in 
the Czech Republic in order to encourage investor confidence (OECD, 2004).  
 
All of these actions and measures have largely changed corporate governance system in the 
Czech Republic. Although the direction chosen was convergence to OECD standards and thus 
adherence to Anglo – American model up to a certain extent, according to the situation in 2003 
the Czech corporate governance was characterised as an insider system, with a small number of 
individual investors and usually many companies owned by banks through their funds or 
subsidiaries. The situation in the Czech Republic was similar to that in Germany where 
commercial banks, through proxy votes, effectively control large equity stakes in firms and thus 
have a large influence on them. Capital-linked owners (companies, banks, insurers, government 




institutions) were usually of a longer–term nature and were also distinguished by their interest 
in eliminating foreign investors, especially in strategic enterprises (Roubičkova, 2005). 
 
2.2.3. The European Union Integration Period and Developments 
Afterwards  
 
In 2004 a revised Code of Corporate Governance was published, reflecting upon revisions in 
OECD Principles from 2004. This new Code does not differ a lot from the one published in 2001, 
but it is designed to illustrate a very dynamic development both in the area of creation and 
implementation of the corporate governance rules and in the actual operation of companies 
(Czech Securities Commission, 2004). The structure is generally the same, except it also contains 
elements proposed by the European Commission in its document “Modernising Company Law 
and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward“ from 
2004. In addition, an even bigger difference is the fact that the new Code is not so biased 
towards Anglo-Saxon approach to corporate governance (Mejstrik, 2005). This is also confirmed 
by the Securities Commission: „In the sense of recommendation of the European Commission to 
leave European companies with a choice between a one- or two-level model of corporate 
governance, the working group ceased to prefer the Anglo-Saxon model, which was followed in 
the original Code of 2001, and, in the 2004, it left upon the companies, whether they will choose 
a German or Anglo-Saxon model.“ (Czech Securities Commission; 2004). OECD and the 
Commission documents were the principal but not the only sources from which the working 
group derived elements for the 2004 Code; the document of the European Federation of 
Accountants (FEE) from 2003 played an important role in conceiving the rules providing for the 
role of audit and auditors. The materials of the Governance Forum, which was active in the 
framework of the European Union, also gave considerable incentives. The adoption of the Code 
by companies was set to be voluntary, but already in 2002 the Securities Commission asked the 
listed companies for the application of the Code and for the compliance declaration. 
 
The 2004 the Code is still the primary source of corporate governance in the Czech Republic. 
Generally there are no new documents in this field made after 2004 that would supplement to 
this Code, despite the obvious lack of adequate rules. Moreover, there is also lack of literature 
and research. It seems to be the case that, after fulfilment of the EU requirements and 
achievement of the certain standard, corporate governance is not very actual topic, neither in 
academic circles nor in practice. 
 




2.3. Corporate Governance in the Republic of Croatia 
 
 
Corporate governance in Croatia was massively characterised by the numerous political and 
social changes in the last period of more than two decades.  Until 1991 Croatia was one of the six 
republics in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). However, due to the rise 
of ethnic tensions and overwhelming desire for independence, especially strengthened after the 
parliamentary elections in 1990, Croatia announced a referendum where the vast majority of 
voting population supported independence. One month later it declared independence and this 
caused a conflict resulting in four-year war that ended in 1995. The break-up of Yugoslavia and 
Croatia's independence created also a major economic change besides the political one, in a 
sense of the transformation from socialist towards capitalist system (which in fact commenced 
during the last years of Yugoslavia). The influence on corporate governance was tremendous 
due to change of companies' ownership and new practices applied through the free market 
economy.  
 
2.3.1. The Privatisation Period and Its Impact on Corporate Governance 
 
Privatisation process created the basis for establishing the modern corporate governance 
principles. In order to understand the outcome of this process, it is necessary to describe it.  
 
There are numerous factors that influenced privatisation, and the most significant ones are: an 
ongoing war with detrimental effects for the population and for the economy; dominance of the 
political party called Croatian Democratic Union which was able to manage the process 
according to its own criteria with the main goal of preserving the economic and political power 
(Bendeković, 2000); the legacy inherited from the previous socialist system, which was 
somewhat different in comparison to the other post-soviet and Eastern European communist 
countries, in such manner that companies were collectively managed by the employees 
themselves – legacy of the system of self-management and social ownership (Franičević, 1999); 
the insufficiently developed capital markets and lack of legal and institutional background to 
support the privatisation process, etc. According to Gregurek (2001), the process of privatisation 
can be divided into four stages. In the first stage (1991-1994), the decision on privatisation 
was autonomous, and companies were in charge of setting the means of their privatisation, but 
until July 1992. Due to the legacy from the socialist system, the main target group in this stage 
were employees who got benefits when buying shares. The second stage (1994-1998) included 
those companies that did not autonomously complete privatisation in the first round. They 




directly became under surveillance of the Croatian Privatisation Fund – CPF (2/3) and national 
pension funds (1/3). Funds owning companies to be privatised used various methods to sell 
their stakes, usually direct selling or public auctions on the Zagreb Stock Exchange. In the third 
stage (1998-2000), the determinant was free of charge distribution (the voucher privatisation). 
It was designed for the specified categories of population – the war victims. Roughly 240,000 
persons were given vouchers that they could exchange directly for shares of the companies at 
CPF's list or for shares of the investment privatisation funds - IPFs that were created by 
different business groups (Gregurek, 2001). The lack of knowledge and experience stimulated 
the owners of vouchers to hand them over to IPFs in exchange for shares of these funds, so 
further trading with these points was done by IPFs – more than 70 percent of the privatisation 
points from these potential shareholders went to the funds. The fourth stage started in 2000 and 
although the privatisation is considered to be over, there are still a number of companies to be 
privatised. At the beginning of this period Ministry of Finance took all the holdings and 
responsibilities from CPF, putting the government in the epicentre of the privatisation even 
more than earlier. This phase was reserved for strategically important companies. Many of 
them are privatised nowadays, such as Croatian Telecom, partially Industrija nafte - INA (the oil 
company), but still there are some in state’s hands.  
 
The process of privatisation in Croatia is considered to be not nearly as efficient as it should 
have been, namely due to an overwhelming engagement of the state which did not only monitor 
the process and enforce the rules, but put itself in the centre and made favourable climate for 
negative appearances such as clientelism, nepotism, favourism, corruption, informal dealings, 
etc. (Franičević, 1999), which created serious distortions for proper functioning of corporate 
governance mechanisms. Due to privatisation, great number of citizens became shareholders: it 
is estimated that almost half million of citizens emerged out of privatisation as shareholders. 
However, most of them were without developed investment culture and knowledge or 
understanding of the fundamental issues related to shareholding or securities in general 
(Galogaža for OECD, 2006); that is why many of them experienced various frauds and failed 
expectations. These are generally minority shareholders and they are considered as a very 
vulnerable group in Croatian corporate governance system, especially if one knows that 
privatisation process has led to highly concentrated ownership structure. One should also bear 
in mind that the legal and institutional framework, as a necessary precondition, was not 
complete, consistent and operational (Franičević, 1999). Moreover, as opposed to OECD 
countries, development of the stock market in Croatia did not match the magnitude of 
privatisation (Galogaža for OECD, 2006). These are all factors that worsened the implementation 
of good corporate governance practices in the privatised companies. 




2.3.2. Changes towards Modern Corporate Governance Practices Adoption 
 
When Croatia started to perceive corporate governance as a priority issue, it was firstly the 
institutional background it needed to improve. A significant effort on side of government, 
legislative body and various regulatory bodies was needed. 
 
Croatia is a civil law country strongly influenced by the German and Austrian legal traditions. 
More recently it has been adapting its legislation to the norms of the European Union (World 
Bank, 2008). Key legislation with regard to corporate governance includes Companies Act and 
Securities Market Act. Companies Act provides rules for establishment and operation of its 
principal bodies: general meeting of shareholders, supervisory board and management board 
(two-tier board system); this act is based on German and Austrian legislation. Securities Market 
Act, which is more linked to Anglo-American legacy (Raspudić, 2011) regulates issues related to 
the supervisory and regulatory body, brokerages, issuing and listing of securities, operations of 
exchanges, and procedures for trading of securities (Galogaža for OECD, 2006). These are 
foundations of the corporate governance framework, and in order to adjust them to the existing 
circumstances they were extensively amended (Companies Act was amended in 2003 and again 
in 2007, Securities Market Act in 2006). Besides these, new acts on Accounting, Auditing, and 
Bankruptcy were introduced; also Act on Takeovers. Moreover, in 2006 Croatian Agency for 
Supervision of Financial Services was created as by merging Croatian Securities Commission, 
Croatian Agency for Supervision of Insurance Companies and Croatian Agency for Supervision of 
Pension Funds and Insurance (Galogaža for OECD, 2006). This institution is the main regulator 
of the non-banking sector, while the Croatian National Bank controls banks. Besides, in 2007 
Varaždin Stock Exchange and Zagreb Stock Exchange merged, retaining the name of the latter, 
and this change represented a creation of single and much more efficient capital market. These 
were all rapid and substantial changes through creation of new institutions and legislation, and 
improvement of existing ones, so consequently roles of private ownership and market forces 
have expanded. This pace of reform has continued to meet the various requirements for 
membership in the European Union (World Bank, 2008). From corporate governance 
perspective, the most straightforward one is the Code of Corporate Governance, issued jointly 
by the Croatian Agency for Supervision of Financial Services and the Zagreb Stock Exchange in 
2007. The Code focuses on disclosure, the general meeting of shareholders, the management 
board and the supervisory board, and covers many aspects of good corporate governance 
consistent with OECD Principles. It is based on the “comply or explain” approach. Moreover, the 
new Capital Market Act became effective in 2009 and it harmonises Croatia’s laws on capital 
market activities with the relevant EU legislation. 




When looking back for decade or two, the usual conclusion on corporate governance 
development brought by international institutions such as World Bank and OECD is that lot of 
effort has been put and many goals are successfully achieved, but on the other, there is still a 
number of areas worth attention. The concentrated structure of ownership obviously creates 
specific corporate governance problems. In general, ownership is concentrated and free float 
limited - the top 10 shareholders owned 80 percent or more of the shares in most companies in 
2008 (World Bank, 2008), and nowadays the situation is similar. Usually the largest shareholder 
has 40 to 50 percent share. Also, level of state ownership is quite high, especially if we take into 
consideration fact that all public companies went through the process of privatisation: the state 
was directly or indirectly the largest single shareholder in 31 percent of public companies 
(Galogaža for OECD, 2006). Therefore, the main conflicts arise between majority or dominant 
shareholder and other (minority) shareholders. Moreover, the government owned companies 
often distort the functioning of the market (for example, they are usually privileged in obtaining 
government contracts) and therefore significantly slow down development of free market 
economy founded on fair and competition between players (Galogaža for OECD, 2006). Based 
upon Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes which benchmarks Croatia’s situation 
relative to OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the institutional capacity needed to 
make them effective, the main recommendations are related to the following areas:  
 
 disclosure of ownership and control structures; 
 role and effectiveness of the shareholders’ meeting; 
 business practices for supervisory boards; 
 independent role of auditors. 
 
In its “Strategy for Croatia 2010-2013”, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) recommends that key reform priorities should include improving legislation on conflicts 
of interest, enhancing disclosure practices in respect of related party transactions and beneficial 
ownership, and strengthening the capacity of the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory 
Agency. Also, EBRD states that key reform challenge is to privatise majority state-owned 
companies, in particular the shipyards, and minority stakes held by the state in commercial 
companies. Corporate governance in the state-owned companies which will not be privatised 
should be improved by replacing political appointees on supervisory boards with experienced 














Source: EBRD Corporate Governance Sector Assessment, 2007 assessment2 
 
This picture’s findings are confirmed by the World Bank’s 2008 Report on the Observance of 
Systems and Codes. The situation nowadays is not substantially different in a sense that the 



















                                                             
2 Note: The extremity of each axis represents an ideal score, i.e., corresponding to OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance. The fuller the ‘web’, the more closely the corporate governance laws of the country 
approximate these principles. 
 




2.4. Comparison of the Czech and Croatian Experience 
 
 
Both Czech Republic and Croatia went through major political and social changes in last two 
decades that made remarkable influence on corporate governance developments.   
 
The Czech Republic being in the communist regime and Croatia being in socialism, both faced 
similar difficulties upon decision to introduce the free market economy. The process of 
privatisation is seen as the determining point that conditioned implementation of modern 
corporate governance practices. Privatisation itself was quite similar in both cases, especially 
the voucher method, which created a large number of minority shareholders whose rights were 
abused by the large IPFs, mainly due to absence of investment knowledge and missing 
legislation - both economies ended up with very concentrated corporate ownership. 
Furthermore, in both countries the state had a dominant role and it was not solely monitoring, 
but actively interfering within the process. Both processes would have been implemented much 
better, but the legal and institutional framework, as a necessary precondition, was not 
functional. On the other hand, the privatisation in the Czech Republic lasted for a shorter period 
of time and therefore occurrence of many more manipulations and obscure activities were 
partially prevented. However, in Croatia this process was quite long, worsened by the war and 
massively distorted by adverse political influences. In that sense, Czech model is considered to 
be more efficient.  
 
After the end of privatisation, both countries were largely influenced by the European Union 
requirements, and they formed/adjusted their legislation in accordance to those. Moreover, they 
adhered to OECD corporate governance guidelines.  
 
Nowadays, it seems that Croatia is few years behind the Czech Republic in terms of development 
of corporate governance mechanisms, but these differences are expected to be diminished over 
time, especially after Croatia’s entering the EU in 2013 and consequent opening to the higher 











2.5. The Corporate Governance Indices3 
 
 
Different indices have been developed by numerous corporations and researchers, such as 
Khanna et al. (2001), Klapper and Love (2002), Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), Black, Jang 
and Kim (2003), the FTSE-ISS Corporate Governance index (2005), Ananchotikul (2008), etc. 
Most of these indices represent a part of authors' effort to prove certain relationship between 
corporate governance and diverse economic appearances, such as globalisation, foreign direct 
investment, trends in market valuation of companies and so on. In this part of literature review, 
the focus will be solely on construction of corporate governance indices, because that is in the 
domain of the research subject. 
 
 
2.5.1. Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia Corporate Governance Index 
 
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) Corporate Governance Index is often used in literature as 
a solid indicator of the level of corporate governance. In 2001, CLSA released a large study of 
corporate governance entitled “Saints and Sinners: Who’s got religion,” which reviewed 
corporate governance at the firm level in 25 emerging markets (Gill, 2001). The construction of 
this index was based on seven sections: Fiscal Discipline, Accounting Transparency/Disclosure, 
Board Independence, Board Accountability, Responsibility, Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
and Social Awareness. The survey consisted of 57 questions, with 70 percent relying on the facts 
from annual reports, stock exchange data and other highly reliable sources, and 30 percent was 
answered considering analysts’ findings. Questions were answered in so called “yes/no” form, 
while in case of unavailable information authors automatically assigned the answer “no” 
indicating that lack of certain information means poor corporate governance in terms of 
disclosure. Khanna, Kogan and Palepu (2001) used this index in their paper searching for 
evidence that globalisation is correlated with convergence of corporate governance. Moreover, 
Klapper and Love (2002) provide a study of firm-level corporate governance practices across 
emerging markets while trying to establish relation between corporate governance, and firm 
performance and market valuation. They constructed a Corporate Governance Index based on 
the CLSA questionnaire data and Worldscope data. Their index consists of six components: 
Management Discipline, Transparency, Independence, Accountability, Responsibility and 
Fairness, which are not classified as sub-indices due to overlapping. 
 
                                                             
3 See Apendix A for more details. 




2.5.2. Governance Index by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick  
 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) constructed a Governance Index in order to proxy for the 
level of shareholder rights at about 1500 large firms in the U.S. during the 1990s. Authors used 
the index in relation to equity prices of these companies on the market, finding that firms with 
stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower 
capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions. Authors identified five groups of 
practices that restrict shareholders’ rights, and accordingly constructed sub-indices for each of 
these five categories: Delay, Protection, Voting, Other, and State. There are 28 provisions in total, 
out of which 24 are unique and the others overlap. For each type of restriction, authors created a 
dummy variable. If the value of the dummy variable is one, the firm has a “bad” governance 
practice. Thus, the Governance Index is just the sum of one point for the existence (or absence) 
of each provision in these five sub-indices. The main data source is the Investor Responsibility 
Research Centre (IRRC), which publishes detailed listings of corporate governance provisions 
for individual firms in the Corporate Takeover Defences publications (Rosenbaum 1990, 1993, 
1995, and 1998), while these data are  derived from a variety of public sources including 
corporate bylaws and charters, proxy statements, annual reports, some documents from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and are supplemented by data on state takeover 
legislation coded from Pinnell (2000). Thus it is possible to track index development over time. 
 
2.5.3. Korean Corporate Governance Index by Black, Jang and Kim 
 
Black, Jang and Kim (2003) tried to prove relation between corporate governance and firms’ 
market value in their working paper for the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). 
They claim that the overall corporate governance index is an important and likely causal factor 
in explaining the market value i.e. higher share prices of Korean public companies. They 
constructed a Korean Corporate Governance Index for 515 Korean companies based on the 2001 
Korea Stock Exchange survey. The index is made of five sub-indices: Shareholder Rights, Board 
Structure, Board Procedure, Disclosure and Ownership Parity. Each sub-index carries a 
maximum of 20 points, while the total value of the overall is 100 points at most. Unlike CLSA 
index which assigns zero value to non-answered question, here authors do not consider it as a 








2.5.4. Corporate Governance Index Series by Financial Times Stock 
Exchange (FTSE) and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)  
 
The index company FTSE in cooperation with ISS created Corporate Governance Index Series in 
2005. The index is a result of an extensive feedback obtained during an industry-wide 
consultation exercise conducted by FTSE and ISS in 2004. Over 2,200 companies rated across 24 
countries from FTSE Developed and FTSE All-Share indices were included, meaning this index is 
appointed at developed markets. The ratings data based on more than 60 corporate governance 
criteria is broken down into five global themes of corporate governance: Compensation Systems 
for Executive and Non-executive Directors, Structure Independence of the Board, Independence 
and Integrity of the Audit Process, Equity Structure and Anti-takeover Provisions, Executive and 
Non-executive Stock Ownership. Companies are rated between one (the lowest) and five (the 
highest) on each theme and overall. As stated by creators of this index, engagement with 
companies represented a key part of the FTSE/ISS initiative, and companies have access to their 
profile and can request changes on a continuous basis. Unlike previously mentioned indices 
which measure the overall state of corporate governance, this index collects companies with 
satisfactory behaviour and therefore comprises only companies with good corporate governance 
practice. 
 
2.5.5. Corporate Governance Index by Ananchotikul 
 
Ananchotikul (2008) constructed a Corporate Governance Index based on firm-level data on 365 
Thai non–financial firms listed in 2004, in order to enlighten the relation between foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and its influence on corporate governance. The index captures all major 
aspects of corporate governance giving them appropriate weight: Board Structure (20 percent), 
Board Responsibility (20 percent), Conflict of Interest (25 percent), Shareholder Rights (10 
percent), and Disclosure and Transparency (25 percent), and each of these items represents 
sub-index. The companies are evaluated using information from various publicly available 
sources such as company disclosure reports, annual reports, company websites, and Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) databases. The overall index is a weighted average of the scores 
given to five components; higher scores indicate better governance practices. The index is 
constructed in such manner that it is positively correlated with alternative measures of 
corporate governance such as board of directors’ independence, the number of board meetings 
and the existence of an employee stock option programme.  
 





The Research Subject 
 
 
The purpose of this research is firstly to describe the corporate governance environment and its 
development in the recent decades, both in the Czech Republic and in Croatia.  Furthermore, the 
essential part of the thesis is to identify the level of good corporate governance practices 
implementation in the companies listed on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) and on the Zagreb 
Stock Exchange (ZSE), whose stocks take part in the PX Index and the CROBEX10 Index. Having 
done that, deeper analysis will be performed in order to outline the crucial governance practices 
which should be subject to necessary improvements. 
 
Having in mind all the changes described in Chapter 2 regarding the transformation of the Czech 
and Croatian economy, corporate governance on the overall level obviously made substantial 
progress in both countries in last couple of decades. Moreover, it seems that both countries were 
developing in the same direction in terms of corporate governance, while the Czech Republic is 
few years ahead in relation to Croatia. Therefore, the main focus of this research is to explore the 
firm-level corporate governance implemented in Czech and Croatian companies nowadays, 
whereas the initial assumption is that Czech companies should generally have better overall 
level of corporate governance. Besides the fact that the Czech Republic already entered 
European Union and thus complies with many legislative standards that are not (fully) applied 
in Croatia, an important notion is also that most of the companies in Czech sample are 
predominantly in foreign ownership. These owners are mainly domiciled in Austria, the 
Netherlands, the U.S., Luxembourg etc., being the countries with typically strong governance 
mechanisms (GovernanceMetrics International, 2010). It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
such companies would bring good practices to the country where they operate up to a certain 
extent (i.e. spill-over effect), although the required level is solely compliance with the local laws 
and governance codes. 
 
The Corporate Governance Index consists of the four sub-indices: Board, Conflict of Interest, 
Shareholders’ Rights, and Transparency and Disclosure. This study will reveal which are the 
main strengths and weaknesses of both samples in terms of the mentioned domains covered by 
the sub-indices. It will be also possible to draw comparisons between two samples with regard 
to those governance domains and explore the reasoning behind. Then the recommendations will 
be addressed in order to diminish or eliminate the problematic areas. 





Methodology   
 
 
4.1. Sample Description 
 
 
This study uses firm-level data for 14 companies listed on the Prague Stock Exchange and for 10 
companies listed on the Zagreb Stock Exchange. Only publically traded companies are taken into 
consideration due to absence of governance information for non-listed companies. Moreover, 
only the most liquid companies on both markets are analysed, since they are market makers not 
only in trading but might also be in terms of corporate governance. 
 
 
4.1.1. The Prague Stock Exchange Sample Description 
 
The sample of Czech companies consists of those which take part in blue chip issues price index, 
the PX Index. It is an index of major stocks traded on the Prague Stock Exchange. Earlier the PX 
Index contained much higher number of stocks, but, as time passed, this number significantly 
dropped because companies with non-liquid stocks were gradually delisted.  
 
A slight digression is necessary here in order to explain this anomaly of massive delisting, since 
it also tells a lot on Czech companies covered by this research. For a standard stock market 
development it is typical that market capitalisation grows as well as the number of securities 
listed. Still, delisting is to a certain extent common occurrence also in developed economies; 
however, the number of delisted companies there is rather insignificant when taking into 
account the market size, whereas in 1997 (year of the biggest delisting) 75 percent of companies 
were delisted from the Prague Stock Exchange (Fungačova, 2005). There are numerous reasons 
for such developments, and in brief the main one is considered to be the voucher privatisation, 
thanks to which shares of privatised companies simply “flooded” the market, which was not able 
to provide the necessary infrastructure for the secondary trading. Huge amounts of shares, 
accompanied with missing legislation and supervisory institutions generated only an illiquid and 
non-transparent market with a low turnover (Fungačova, 2005). Therefore, the initial delisting 
began due to bankruptcy and limited transferability of securities, but after that, from 1997 
onwards, it was mainly due to the Prague Stock Exchange authorities’ decision based on the 
fulfilment of certain criteria regarding traded value, market capitalisation, etc.  








Source: Fungačova (2005) 
 
This theme field on process of delisting from the Prague Stock Exchange goes far beyond 
purposes of this research, and at this point there are enough evidences to understand the 
background of today’s Czech stock market and very low number of companies included in its 
main price index.  
 
Table 2: List of Companies in the PX Index, Prague Stock Exchange 
 
Company Index Weight (%) 
Erste Group Bank AG            21,48 
ČEZ, a.s.    18,95 
Komerčni banka, a.s.    17,30 
Telefonica Czech Republic, a.s.  15,31 
Vienna Insurance Group  AG 13,41 
New World Resources Plc.  4,42 
Unipetrol a.s.   3,84 
Philip Morris ČR a.s.  2,72 
Central European Media Enterprises Ltd. 0,95 
Fortuna Entertainment Group N.V.    0,63 
Pegas Nonwovens S.A.  0,50 
Orco Property Group S.A.    0,21 
AAA Auto Group N.V.   0,16 
KIT Digital, Inc.  0,13 
Total 100,00 
 
Source: the Prague Stock Exchange, as of 16.3.2012 
 
 




4.1.2. The Zagreb Stock Exchange Sample Description 
 
Unlike Czech capital market, the Zagreb Stock Exchange did not have any issues with massive 
securities’ delisting. When it comes to the Croatian companies taking part in this research, the 
same criteria were used as with the Czech companies, i.e. only the most liquid companies were 
taken into consideration. The Zagreb Stock Exchange created its main share price index CROBEX, 
which consists of 25 companies’ shares. However, for the purposes of this research companies 
constructing another index - CROBEX10 Index, will be used. It is a reduced form of the CROBEX 
Index that takes its ten top blue chip securities in terms of free-float market capitalisation and 
liquidity.  
 
Table 3: List of Companies in the CROBEX10 Index, Zagreb Stock Exchange 
 
Company Index Weight (%) 
Adris grupa d.d. 21,30 
HT d.d.   17,90 
Ericsson Nikola Tesla d.d.  12,80 
Podravka d.d. 11,10 
Končar – elektroindustrija d.d. 8,30 
Atlantska plovidba d.d.  8,10 
AD Plastik d.d.  6,60 
Dalekovod d.d  6,30 
Atlantic grupa d.d.  5,70 
Ingra d.d.  1,90 
Total 100,00 
 
Source: the Zagreb Stock Exchange, as of 16.3.2012 
 
4.1.3. Essential Similarities and Differences of Two Samples 
 
As systematically pointed out in Chapter 2, there are numerous similarities between 
development of corporate governance in Czech and Croatian cases. Here it is necessary to stress 
once more that privatisation process, which initially created dispersed ownership, eventually 
resulted in predominantly concentrated ownership in both countries. Consequently, 78 percent 
of the PX companies have either one or few dominant shareholders, and in the CROBEX10 






















Source: author’s calculations 
 
However, the huge differences exist in terms of these companies’ ownership; while owners in 
Croatia are mainly domestic entities, in the Czech Republic it is not the case. The picture shows 
solely those companies with concentrated ownership (both one and few dominant 
shareholders) and the proportions where that owner is either domestic or foreign entity. 91 
percent of the PX companies with concentrated ownership have one or more dominant 
shareholders that are foreigners; in the CROBEX10 companies, this number is equal to 43 
percent. Nevertheless this should not present an issue for the research since companies in 
foreign ownership also comply with the local governance rules and customs, and therefore it is 
reliable to track behaviour of such companies as an indicator of firm-level corporate governance 
in the country in question, regardless of their owners in this context. 
 




































Source: author’s calculations 
 
It is also important to see the percentage of the companies in which the state holds a stake, as 
shown in the upper column chart. It presents the percentage of companies where the state has a 
significant portion in the ownership structure. Among the PX companies, there is only one that is 
controlled by state, where the state possesses nearly 70 percent of its shares. There are three 
CROBEX10 companies with the state largely participating in ownership, and its average share in 
these companies is around 25 percent. 
 
Another important point of departure between samples is the fact that lots of companies of the 
PX Index have almost negligible weight in that index, meaning their free float market 
capitalisation is relatively low, and that they are not largely traded on the stock exchange. On the 
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The basic information on companies selected, especially with regard to the ownership structure 
and similar relations, is gathered mainly through the Thomson One database made by Thomson 
Reuters, which is considered to be the premier comprehensive database of information suitable 
for analyst research. Although such information is usually available directly from the companies’ 
corporate materials, this database provides easier access to all the facts at one place. 
 
Furthermore, the Corporate Governance Questionnaire designed for the purposes of this thesis 
is used as the main instrument of data gathering4. It consists of four sections that correspond to 
the sub-indices of the Corporate Governance Index: Board of Directors, Conflict of Interest, 
Shareholders’ Rights, and Transparency and Disclosure. It contains 40 questions, and answers to 
those are transformed5 so as to represent the variables. The CG Questionnaire is in the first place 
appointed at the high-ranking officials of a company, who may be able to respond properly to 
the listed questions due to their engagement in the business and level of expertise (members of 
the board, top managers, the company secretary, Investor Relations department officials, 
Corporate Governance department officials, or more officials jointly). Information asked in the 
CG Questionnaire that is also publically accessible (through annual reports, articles of 
association, other documents published by the company or some other trustworthy 









                                                             
4 See Appendix B for detailed structure of the Corporate Governance Questionnaire, as well as Appendix C 
for benchmarks of governance practices. 
5 Answers are coded so that good practice is given a value of one, and bad practices is given a value of zero. 








The Corporate Governance Index has foundations in the work of Ananchotikul (2008) and Black, 
Jang and Kim (2003), precisely described in Chapter 2. However, the approach used in this 
assessment of corporate governance quality on a firm level is more detailed, as majority of 
questions require „a level beyond“ corporate governance in a sense that they reflect the most 
recent best practices recommended by OECD, the EU and national regulators. This automatically 
creates space for distinction between companies that simply follow regulatory requirements, 
and those that truly strive to catch up with modern corporate governance trends and adopt most 
up-to-date recommendations. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that blind following of best 
practices does not necessarily lead to an effective system. The simple reason is that, despite the 
best efforts of regulatory, commercial, and academic experts, no one has yet identified standards 
that are consistently associated with improved corporate outcomes – this also includes 
recommendations of blue-ribbon panels, corporate governance indices and ratings (Larcker, 
Tayan; 2011). Therefore, the careful interpretation of the resulting CG Index is needed, since 
obviously there is no magic recipe, nor “one size fits all” approach can be used - individual firms 
success is dependant also on their setting, the interactions of their constituents, and the 
processes by which the corporate strategy is planned and executed (Larcker, Tayan; 2011).  
 
In terms of the governance domains covered, the approach followed is generally taken from 
Ananchotikul (2008), except for the fact that practices under Board Structure and Board 
Responsibilities are here encompassed by one domain simply called Board. Besides Board, there 
are three more domains: Conflict of Interest, Shareholders' Rights and Transparency and 
Disclosure.  Each of them practically represents a separate sub-index in the overall Corporate 













4.4. The Corporate Governance Index 
 
 
4.4.1. The Process of the Corporate Governance Index Construction 
 
Composite indicator development involves stages where subjective judgements have to be 
made: the selection of individual indicators, the treatment of missing values, the choice of 
normalisation techniques, the weights of the indicators and aggregation methods, etc. All these 
subjective decisions are the “bones” of the composite indicator and, together with the 
information provided by the numbers themselves, shape the message communicated by the 
composite indicator (Nardo et al. for OECD and the EC, 2008). The absence of an objective way to 
determine methods does not necessarily lead to rejection of the validity of composite indicators, 
as long as the entire process is transparent (Nardo et al. for OECD and the EC, 2008). Therefore, 
for each of the mentioned methodological issues there are certain standardised approaches, but 
the choice of those depends on author's goals and on the suitability determined by different 
means. In the following lines the main methodological phases and methods will be presented. 
 
The process of the index construction is mainly based on OECD recommendations, and it is 
divided into phases. For the last two phases, different methods are used in parallel, resulting in 
four index types. Finally, the choice of an ultimate indicator is given by determining each index 
type’s correlation to the proxy of good corporate governance – director’s independence.6 
 









Source: author’s demonstration 
                                                             
6
 See section 4.4.2. Explanatory Power of Different Index Types, where the correlation to the proxy 
measure defines the most suitable methods of index calculation and the choice of the best  index type. 
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1. Selection of Indicators 
 
Variables are selected in such way that allows covering four main domains of corporate 
governance on the firm level, as mentioned in the upper text. Many of these variables appear in 
the work of Ananchotikul (2008), but the majority is selected by following the most recent best 
practice recommendations. In total there are 40 variables (corresponding to 40 questions from 
the CG Questionnaire), and the values assigned are dummies: one if the company follows a good 
practice, zero if it does not. These 40 variables are then aggregated into four main indicators 
representing sub-indices: Board, Conflict of Interest, Shareholders' Rights, and Transparency 
and Disclosure. Therefore, governance of 14 Czech and 10 Croatian companies is examined in 
terms of four principal indicators. 
 
2. Data Adjustments  
 
In order to make the variables ready for usage, firstly they should be normalised. In this case it is 
fairly straightforward and therefore there is no need for further explanations. One other 
important aspect is dealing with missing data, which is solved by replacing those data with the 
lowest score, as suggested in numerous research papers dealing with an index construction7. 
Since a lack of corporate governance information should be correlated with poor corporate 
governance, this practice should not lead to large errors (Ananchotikul, 2008). 
 
3. Analysis of Index Consistency 
 
Consistency analysis should demonstrate that the raw data and the ready-made indices are 
consistent for the final step - their aggregation (Groh, Wich; 2009). It is especially important 
when derivative variables are intended to be used for subsequent predictive analyses. If the 
analysis indicates poor consistency and reliability, then individual items must be re-examined 
and modified or completely changed as needed (Santos, 1999).  As recommended by numerous 
authors (Raykov, 1998; Cortina, 1993; Feldt et al., 1987; Green et al., 1977), there are certain 
tests to be performed in order to identify consistency, such as Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha, 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity. The last 
two measures are also used as a precondition for the factor analysis. 
 
The Cronbach’s Coefficient Alpha (Cronbach, 1951) is a coefficient of reliability suitable for an 
estimate of the internal consistency of items in a model or a survey. It assesses how well a set of 
                                                             
7 See Chapter 2: 2.5. The Corporate Governance Indices. 




individual indicators (here sub-indices) measures a single uni-dimensional object (Nardo et al. 
for OECD and the EC, 2008). One could also say that it measures the portion of total variability of 
the sample of individual indicators due to correlation of indicators. Definition is as follows:  
 
   𝛼 =
𝑛𝑅 
1+ 𝑛−1 𝑅 
   , 
where n is a number of the index components, and 𝑅  is mean correlation of the items. 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha increases with the number of individual indicators and with the covariance of 
each pair. This coefficient ranges in value from zero to one. It is zero if there is no correlation 
among sub-indices. On the other hand, if they are perfectly correlated, it is equal to one. High 
Cronbach’s Alpha (or equivalently a high reliability) is an indication that the underlying 
individual indicators proxy the desired variable well (Groh, Wich; 2009). A question is how large 
the Cronbach's Alpha should be. Nunnaly (1978) argues that value of 0.7 is an acceptable 
reliability threshold. Yet some authors use 0.75 or 0.80 as a cut-off value, while others are as 
lenient as to go to 0.6 (Nardo et al. for OECD and the EC, 2008). 
 





Cronbach's Alpha Based 
on Standardised Items Number of Items 
.704 .736 4 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations using SPSS software 
 
The left-hand side column of the table is used instead of the standardised column since the 
variances of individual indicators showed a limited spread. This is also advisable since the scale 
in the CG Questionnaire is dichotomous (when there is a mixture of scales in the survey, 
relatively heterogeneous variances would appear in which case the use of standardised 
variables would have been more appropriate) (Santos, 1999). As it is shown in the table, the 
output has a Cronbach's Alpha of 0.704, which is good considering 0.70 as the cut-off value. 
 
It is also useful to determine how the Cronbach's Alpha varies with the deletion of each 
individual indicator at a time, as shown in the upper table. This helps to reveal the existence of 
redundant indicators. If the reliability coefficient increases after deleting an individual indicator 
from the scale, one can assume that the individual indicator is not correlated highly with other 
individual indicators, and is not measuring the same construct as the rest of the indicators in the 
scale. Obviously this is not the case here, and all the indicators can be kept. 




Table 5: Cronbach’s Aplha Coefficient if an Item Deleted 
  
 Corrected Item -Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
Board .536 .627 
Conflict  .588 .604 
Rights .431 .703 
Transparency .563 .600 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations using SPSS software 
 
 
The other two measures besides Cronbach’s Alpha demonstrate that the data are consistent for 
their aggregation; besides, they also represent a precondition for the factor analysis.  
 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy is based on the partial 
correlation among the input variables, and it varies between zero and one. A value of zero 
indicates that there is a diffusion in the pattern of correlations (factor analysis is not 
appropriate). A value close to one means that the patterns of correlations are relatively compact 
(factor analysis should give meaningful results). Kaiser (1974) indicates that values higher than 
0.5 are acceptable: values from 0.5 to 0.7 are mediocre, values from 0.7 to 0.8 are good, values 
from 0.8 to 0.9 are very good and those above 0.9 are superb. Therefore, data in this analysis 
fulfil this criterion meaning patterns of correlation are solid and subsequently factor analysis 
can be performed. 
 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity indicates whether the correlation matrix is not an identity matrix, 
and therefore, can be factorised (Groh, Wich; 2009). The value of the test statistic should be 
below the 0.05 significance level. The data do not satisfy this measure. However, though 5 
percent is a conventional significance level, one can test the data at 10 percent significance level 
as well, and in that case the data would satisfy the criterion. 
 
Table 6: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin and Bartlett’s Test 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .758 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 17.270 
Degrees of Freedom 6 
Significance .008 
 
Source: author’s calculations using SPSS software 




4. Weighting of Sub-indices 
 
 
Equal Weighting is a common scheme and, according to Nardo et al. (2005), most composite 
indicators rely on it. Since all variables are given the same weight, this essentially implies that all 
variables are “worth” the same in the composite. Still, this can also disguise the absence of a 
statistical or an empirical basis, e.g. when there is insufficient knowledge of causal relationships 
or a lack of consensus on the alternative (Nardo et al. for OECD and the EC, 2008).  
 
Factor analysis is a statistical procedure that linearly transforms a large set of variables into a 
smaller number of uncorrelated variables that retain most of the information contained in the 
original set of variables (Dunteman, 1989; Filmer, Pritchett, 2001). According to factor analysis, 
each component is given a weight based on its contribution to the total variance in the data. This 
ensures that the resulting summary of indicators account for a large part of the cross-country 
variance of the underlying items (Groh, Wich; 2009). Nicoletti et al. (2000) stress that properties 
of factor analysis are particularly desirable for cross-country comparisons. Besides, Nardo et al. 
(2005) state that the basic idea behind factor analysis is that it may be possible to present a set 
of Q variables in terms of a smaller number of m factors – the general form of the factor analysis 
is given as follows: 
 
X1 = α11F1 + α12F2 + ⋯ + α1m Fm + e1  
 
X2 = α21 F1 + α22 F2 + ⋯ + α2m Fm + e2  
 
                 ... 
XQ = αQ1F1 + αQ2F2 + ⋯ + αQm Fm + eQ  
 
Variables xi have zero mean and unit variance; ai1, ai2, ..., aim are the factor loadings related to 
variable Xi; F1, F2, ..., Fm are m uncorrelated common factors with zero mean and unit variance; ei 
are the Q specific factors supposed independently and identically distributed with zero mean 
(Groh, Wich; 2009).  
 
Nardo et al. (2005) stress that, in order to deal with that model, the most often used method in 
development of composite indicators is principal component analysis. It extracts the first m 
principal components considering them as factors, while neglecting the remaining. Factor 
analysis is primarily attractive because it is able to mathematically determine the weights that 
will maximise the variation in the linear composite (Dunteman, 1989). As stated in OECD 
Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators (2008), according to the factor analysis, 
weighting intervenes only to correct for overlapping information between two or more 
correlated indicators and it is not a measure of the theoretical importance of the associated 
indicator (Nardo et al. for OECD and the EC, 2008). 




There are several steps in performing factor analysis. The first step is to check the correlation 
structure of the data, because if no correlation between indicators is found, then weights cannot 
be estimated by this method.  
 
Table 7: Correlation among Sub-indices as a Precondition for Factor Analysis 
 
Correlation Matrixa 
  Board Conflict Rights Transparency 
Correlation Board 1.000 .466 .340 .443 
 Conflict .466 1.000 .353 .509 
Rights .340 .353 1.000 .355 
Transparency .443 .509 .355 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Board  .011 .052 .015 
Conflict .011  .046 .005 
Rights .052 .046  .045 
Transparency .015 .005 .045  
a. Determinant = ,437 
 
Source: author’s calculations using SPSS software 
 
The correlation matrix explains the relationships' pattern among indicators. The top half of the 
table contains the Pearson correlation coefficients between sub-indices, and the bottom half 
represents the one-tailed significance of the coefficients. The coefficients should not be too 
correlated (higher than 0.9), nor very weakly correlated (lower than 0.3 approximately) or even 
uncorrelated. The significance values should not be greater than 0.05 (value of 0.052 can be 
rounded at 0.05 so that it can still be accepted). The determinant should be at least 0.00001. If all 
conditions are satisfied, as it is the case here, multicolinearity should not appear as an obstacle, 
and factor analysis can be performed. 
 
The second step is the extraction of a certain number of latent factors representing the data. 
Each factor depends on a set of coefficients called loadings, and each coefficient measures the 
correlation between the individual indicator and the latent factor (Nardo et al. for OECD and the 
EC, 2008). Then only a subset of principal factors is retained - those that account for the largest 
amount of the variance. Criteria for choosing factors are standardised as those that: 
 have eigenvalues larger than one; 
 contribute individually to explanation of the overall variance by more than 10 percent; 
 contribute cumulatively to explanation of the overall variance by more than 60 percent.   




At this point an issue arises in terms of selection of the factors, since not all of three mentioned 
criteria are satisfied at the same time. However, a cumulative variance that is slightly below 
required benchmark of 60 percent is believed to represent a smaller discrepancy than inclusion 
of the factor that has dramatically lower eigenvalue, especially in comparison to the first one 
chosen. Therefore, only one factor will be selected, and further analysis will be performed 
respectively. 
 
Table 8: Factor Analysis Performed by the Principal Components Analysis 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.241 56.016 56.016 2.241 56.016 56.016 
2 .706 17.643 73.658    
3 .566 14.139 87.798    
4 .488 12.202 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Source: author’s calculations using SPSS software 
 
Extraction of only one factor that explains a large part of the data variance means that the key 
drivers are adequate joint proxies for a single latent factor. They are uni-dimensional, and 
express one characteristic. The interpretation of this result is that choice of key drivers is 
appropriate for the purposes of assessing corporate governance for two samples of companies; 
corporate governance on a firm level is very well measured by using four criteria. 
 
The third step deals with the calculation of the weights for four drivers. The square of a factor 
loading represents the proportion of the variance of the indicator explained by the factors. The 
component weight of a sub-index is received by multiplying value of the component for each 
indicator with adequate number representing squared factor loading (elements scaled to unity 
sum). The table below presents the factor loadings and the resulting weights for the individual 
key drivers. Conflict of Interest Sub-index has the highest weight, while the lowest one is 










Table 9: Weighting Obtained Using Factor Analysis 
 




Squared factor loadings 
scaled to unity sum 
Weights 
 1    
Board .756 .57 .34 .26 
Conflict .792 .63 .35 .28 
Rights .656 .43 .29 .19 
Transparency .783 .61 .35 .27 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
∑ = 2.24 
  
a. 1 components extracted.    
 
Source: author’s calculations using SPSS software 
 
5. Aggregation of the Corporate Governance Index  
 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1963) clearly shows that no perfect aggregation 
convention can exist. Nevertheless, there are couple of most common techniques used for 
composite indicators aggregation, among which two will be used for the purposes of this work - 
linear and geometric aggregation.   
 
Nardo et al. (2005) argue that linear aggregation assigns base indicators proportionally to the 
weights. Ebert and Welsch (2004) stress the importance of linear aggregation when all sub-
indicators have the same measurement unit. Linear aggregation can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝑥 =  𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖   ,    𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0
𝑖




Nardo et al. (2005) also define the geometric aggregation as an appropriate technique often used 
in construction of composite indicators. It can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝑥 =  𝑥𝑖
𝑤 𝑖
𝑖
 ,   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 ≤  𝑤𝑖 ≤ 1, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤 = 1 
𝑖
 








4.4.2. Explanatory Power of Different Index Types 
 
 
At this stage, based on different weighting schemes (equal weights, factor analysis provided 
weights) and aggregation methods (linear, geometric), it is possible to produce four different 
types of index by combining mentioned techniques. It is expected that the minor discrepancies 
would appear in terms of various index types, and they may be even more emphasized because 
of the small sample issue. In order to determine to most suitable version of the Corporate 
Governance Index, the methodology developed by Groh and Wich (2009) is being applied. 
Therefore, a correlation of all index types to some proxy of good corporate governance is 
examined, and index type that has the highest correlation to this proxy is selected as the best 
indicator of corporate governance quality. 
 
Practice of more than 50 percent of members of the board of directors (unitary or one-tier board 
system) or supervisory board (two-tier board system) being independent is taken as a proxy of 
good firm-level corporate governance. Many authors claim that there is the pervasive use of the 
board independence as an indicator of the efficacy of the governance system (Baber, Liang; 
2008). A comparative study of the corporate governance codes used in the European Union 
defines independence as lack of close family ties or business relations with the management of 
the company, with the controlling shareholder or with a group of controlling shareholders (Weil, 
Gotshal, Manges; 2002). This practice is highly recommended in OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance (2004). Moreover, it is unquestionably considered to be the best international 
practice and very few issues in related academic work generate as much consensus as this one 
(Shivdasani, Zenner; 2002). Independent board members generally give value to decision-
making process, for instance by bringing an objective view to the evaluation of the performance 
of the board and management, by playing an important role in areas where the interests of 
management, the company and its shareholders may diverge such as executive remuneration, 
succession planning, changes of corporate control, take-over defences, large acquisitions and the 
audit function (OECD, 2004). There are plenty empirical evidences regarding situations 
requiring a specific board decision, stating that the outcome is more likely to be beneficial to 
shareholders when the board consists of a majority of independent outside directors 
(Shivdasani, Zenner; 2002). 
Levels of correlation among various index types and the variable Directors’ Independence are 
presented in the right-hand side column of the table below. It seems that the additional effort to 
perform factor analysis caused slightly worse results. The Corporate Governance Index based on 
the equal weighting and aggregated by the linear method has the highest correlation coefficient, 
and is therefore picked as the most reliable indicator of firm-level corporate governance for the 




two samples. However, it is important to stress that no matter which type of the Corporate 
Governance Index is used, it is not a failure because usage of all methods is theoretically 
justified. 
 
Table 10: Correlation of Different Index Versions to Directors’ Independence  
 
CGI_FA_Lin CGI_EW_Lin CGI_FA_Geo CGI_EW_Geo Dir__Ind  
1,0000 0,9980* 0,9963* 0,9934* 0,6511* CGI_FA_Lin 
 1,0000 0,9953* 0,9966* 0,6615*  CGI_EW_Lin 
  1,0000 0,9979* 0,6526* CGI_FA_Geo 
   1,0000 0,6601*  CGI_EW_Geo 
    1,0000 Dir__Ind 
 


























                                                             
8 * - significance level at 1 percent. 
 





Empirical Results   
 
 
In this chapter the results obtained by previously described methodology will be presented. The 
core outcomes are revealed in differences and similarities of the two samples, according to their 
performance in terms of corporate governance quality measured by the Corporate Governance 
Index. Although the samples considered are relatively small, the results should be taken as 
relevant, especially because the conclusions to be brought will be interpreted solely at the level 
of the mentioned companies, not crossing beyond and drawing inferences on the general state of 
corporate governance in the selected countries. 
  
 
5.1. How Well are Sub-indices Correlated among Each Other and 
to the Corporate Governance Index?  
 
 
It is important to outline whether the correlation coefficients of all sub-indices, measuring their 
mutual correlation and correlation to the Corporate Governance Index, are significant, as well as 
to verify that they do not have contradictory signs that do not match theoretical explanation. 
According to the table below, all the sub-indices have significant correlation coefficients, as well 
as positive signs just as expected. Among all sub-indices, Transparency and Disclosure Sub-index 
has the highest correlation to the Corporate Governance Index, whereas the lowest one is 
achieved by the Shareholders’ Rights Sub-index. In general, the lowest coefficient is the one 
explaining correlation between the Board and Shareholders’ Rights Sub-indices. The potential 
theoretical justification might lie in the level of directors’ influence on set of variables examined 
by the Shareholders’ Rights Sub-index. Some of the variables, namely the voting mechanism 
using modern communication technology, as well as practice of shareholders right of cumulative 
voting in electing directors, often depend on the overall governance environment (including 










Table 11: Correlation Coefficients of the Index and Sub-indices 
 
Board Conflict Rights T_D CGI  
1,0000 0,4220** 0,2923*** 0,4181** 0,6783* Board 
 1,0000 0,3524*** 0,5096** 0,8066* Conflict 
  1,0000 0,3544*** 0,6199* Rights 
   1,0000 0,8235* Transparency 
    1,0000 CGI 
 
Source: author’s calculations using Gretl software9 
 
 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance Index Scores 
 
 
In this section the performance of the two samples in terms of the Corporate Governance Index 
will be compared more into detail. The following two tables represent statistical differences of 
the PX companies and the CROBEX10 companies. One can notice that major differences exist in 
terms of all statistic indicators.  
  
Table 12: Summary Statistics of the PX Companies CGI Score 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
0,762364 0,808450 0,561200 0,901800 
Std. Dev. C.V. Skewness Ex. kurtosis 
0,0987880 0,129581 -0,710929 -0,673463 
 
Source: author’s calculations using Gretl software 
 
Table 13: Summary Statistics of the CROBEX10 Companies CGI Score 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
0,630890 0,640850 0,348700 0,825400 
Std. Dev. C.V. Skewness Ex. kurtosis 
0,149415 0,236831 -0,421514 -0,607154 
 




                                                             
9 *, ** and *** - significance levels at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 




The box plot below depicts both samples by displaying five descriptive statistics: the median, the 
upper and lower quartiles, and the minimum and maximum values. It is a graphical method that 
presents the information from the upper two tables. Box plot is a powerful instrument for 
analysis because it gives some idea on the shape of the sample, particularly when several 
samples are lined up alongside one another as it is the case here. The box length gives an 
indication of the sample variability - the box itself represents the middle half of the sample 
(interequartile range of the sample), with an end at each quartile. The CROBEX10 sample has 
somewhat higher variability (degree of dispersion) than the PX sample; this will be analysed 
further by using histograms. The line across the box (median) shows where the sample is 
centred: the PX companies have highly oblique median towards the upper quartile, and this is 
also related to the symmetry of the sample - box plot is therefore a useful indicator of symmetry 
or skewness. Both PX and CROBEX10 sample are skewed to the left, whereas the latter has much 
lower skewness. Moreover, identifying outliers also explains symmetry of the sample, and they 
exist if one tail (the vertical line from the end of the box until minimum/maximum value - 
whisker) is longer than the other. In the CROBEX10 sample, the lower vertical line is much 
longer, implying that the sample is being tailed to the left. Still the existence of an outlier cannot 
be defined here in accordance to the box plot interpretation (values which are between one and 
a half and three box lengths from either end of the box obtain a status of outliers).  
  





Source: author’s calculations using SPSS software 
 
 




Histograms also serve as a useful tool to describe the sample distribution since they depict 
frequencies of sample values. The idea is to get some notion of the location, spread and the 
overall shape of data, and to possibly highlight any salient features. The normality assumption is 
not assumed in neither of samples since they are too small, and therefore histogram charts will 
serve only to categorise companies with regard to their performance in terms of the overall 
Corporate Governance Index.  In the first sample, the PX companies, distribution is not normal; it 
is rather skewed to the left as it is also previously confirmed by the descriptive statistic data and 
the box plot chart. The histogram shows that most of the companies are grouped into the 
category of results between 75 to 82 percent (four companies) and 82 to 89 percent (four 
companies) according to the performance in terms of the Corporate Governance Index. This fact 
also explains the median that is very close to the upper quartile value, as shown in the box plot. 
There are no outliers. 
 




Source: author’s calculations using Gretl software 
 
In the second sample, the CROBEX10 companies, it is obvious that distribution is not normal and 
it is skewed to the left, although substantially less in comparison to the first sample. The 
histogram shows that most of the companies are grouped into the category of results between 
63 to 70 percent (three companies), 47 to 54 percent (two companies) and 77 to 84 percent 
(two companies) according to the performance in terms of the Corporate Governance Index. 
Moreover, there is a company that could be classified as an outlier, however according to the box 




plot interpretation it should still be kept. One important difference is that Croatian companies’ 
results have higher variability than the Czech ones. 
 












After analysing main statistic differences between two samples, it is necessary to see a 
systematic depiction of the results which are the main conclusion of this research: the 
performance of the Czech and Croatian companies in terms of the overall Corporate Governance 
Index, as well as in terms of individual sub-indices.  
 
The table below shows that the PX Index companies have much better performance concerning 
the overall Corporate Governance Index, equalling 76 percent. On the other hand, the CROBEX10 
companies have a worse overall performance, totalling 63 percent. Therefore, the research 








Table 14: Two Samples’ Performance – the Corporate Governance Index and Sub-indices 10 
 
 PX Companies CROBEX10 Companies 
Board Sub-index 18.31 15.63 
Conflict of Interest Sub-index 19.13 15.71 
Shareholders’ Rights Sub-index 16.84 17.50 
Transparency and Disclosure Sub-index 21.96 14.25 
Corporate Governance Index 76.24 63.09 
 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
In order to interpret individual sub-indices results, radar charts are often used. One can notice 
that the PX companies are dominant in three sub-indices performance: Board, Conflict of 
Interest, and Transparency and Disclosure, while the latter is the main driver boosting the 
overall result. The CROBEX10 companies have slightly better result (less than 1 percentage 
point difference) solely in the Shareholders’ Rights Sub-index.  
 























Source: author’s calculations 
 
                                                             



















Starting with the Board Sub-index, the Czech companies have a significant advantage in 
comparison to the Croatian companies. The principal differences in favour of the Czech over 
Croatian companies exist with regard to the following governance practices: 
 requirement for majority of supervisory board members/board of directors’ non-
executive members to be independent; 
 requirement for the remuneration received by the members of the supervisory 
board/non-executive members of the board of directors to be partially determined 
according to their contribution to the company's business performance (variable part); 
 requirement for directors to have initial and regular trainings related to their 
engagement in the company; 
 requirement for self-evaluation of the engagement in the preceding period (including 
evaluation of the contribution and competence of individual members, as well as of joint 
activities of the board and committees) by the supervisory board/non-executive 
members of the board of directors. 
 
In terms of the Conflict of Interest Sub-index, Czech companies again have a better score. 
Sources of this advantage are better performance considering existence of board committees 
and internal audit department/function. Much higher percentage of the PX companies has these 
governance bodies in comparison to the CROBEX10 companies.  
 
Shareholders’ Rights Sub-index reveals the only governance domain where Croatian companies 
achieved better results, although this advantage is negligible. Therefore, according to this 
assessment, shareholders rights protection is similar in both countries. It seems that such result 
is compatible with the theoretical description of the main corporate governance issues in both 
Czech Republic and Croatia contained in Chapter 2 (it that section, it is deduced that one of the 
problems in both countries is lack of shareholders rights protection - especially minority 
shareholders’ rights, and that this appearance should be on a fairly similar level).  
 
Transparency and Disclosure Sub-index is the domain where the PX companies have the highest 
advantage. The main differences in favour of Czech companies exist with regard to public 
disclosure of the following information: 
 detailed records on remuneration of board members;  
 statement on compliance with the code of corporate governance and explanation of 
potential departures; 
 detailed information on each board member (biography, positions held in other 
companies, etc.); 
 analysts’ coverage of share information. 




The fact that Czech companies performed better than Croatian ones in terms of the mentioned 
practices does not mean that they fully adhere to these practices, yet there is still lot of space for 
improvements in these fields on both sides.  
 
 




Besides the points of departure between two samples, one could extract the common 
weaknesses because they are meaningful for both groups of companies as they could be subject 
to improvement. 
 
When analysing the Board Sub-index variables, it seems that the issue of long term succession 
planning is being neglected – only 64 percent of Czech companies and 60 percent of Croatian 
companies comply with this widely recommended best practice. 
 
With the Conflict of Interest Sub-index, most of the attention should be devoted to 
implementation of board committees as governing bodies which ensure more professional and 
transparent decision making, namely remuneration and nomination committee. In terms of 
remuneration committee, 78 percent of Czech and 40 percent of Croatian companies – obviously 
Czech companies do have solid score but still it can be improved. Nomination committee is 
present in 57 percent of the PX companies and in 30 percent of the CROBEX10 companies. 
 
Shareholders’ Rights Sub-index issues are, as already mentioned, influenced by the environment 
(for instance shareholder voting using modern technologies), however better voting schemes 
should be assured in order to prevent abuse of (namely minority) shareholders’ rights, such as 
cumulative voting system in electing directors which is marginalised in both samples. Moreover, 
practice of external auditors being present at annual general meeting of shareholders should be 
prioritised in both PX and CROBEX10 companies. 
 
Domain covered by the Transparency and Disclosure Sub-index is the one where Czech 
companies have exceptional score regarding most of the selected variables. The lowest score 
achieved though is with regard to disclosure of explanations of departures from the corporate 
governance code, being also one of the most problematic practices in the CROBEX10 companies 
(while the PX companies still have dramatically better score). 
 









Although this thesis systematically presents development of corporate governance both in the 
Czech Republic and in Croatia in recent period, its major value is creation of the Corporate 
Governance Index. This index is a composite indicator of firm-level corporate governance based 
on OECD methodology recommendations, and represents a first such trial to measure 
governance mechanisms implemented in the Czech and Croatian companies to the author's best 
knowledge. The main advantage this index offers, as compared to using a group of single 
indicators available, is that it is composed of different but related indicators that are able to 
comprise various domains of a multifaceted phenomenon such as corporate governance. The 
domains taken into consideration cover the most significant governance practices on a firm-level 
with regard to board structure and functioning, conflict of interest, shareholders' rights, and 
transparency and disclosure. Interpretation of the Corporate Governance Index results shows 
the main strengths and weaknesses of both PX and CROBEX10 companies, so this is powerful, 
“eye-catching” tool for advocacy. By its nature, an index is conducive to a quick overview and has 
an overwhelming advantage in relation to complementary indicators; it also facilitates the use of 
statistics by the public and policymakers (Wiesmann, 2006). In international rankings such as in 
this case, an index can foster a sense of competition among countries and thus help to promote 
good practices and policies to encourage them (Streeten 1994; Ryten 2000). 
 
Although the Corporate Governance Index developed in this thesis covers two relatively small 
samples of companies, it is still a very useful and accurate indicator of corporate governance 
implemented there. The small sample issue arose due to the fact that the approach followed was 
based on taking into consideration only the most liquid companies on both markets, since these 
blue chip issuers represent the core of the market and it is worth to observe the corporate 
governance in “living” companies, not in those that are barely traded. Besides, the unlisted 
companies were not scrutinised since they are largely non-transparent and necessary 
information would be hard to gather. However, further research may be based on inclusion of 
companies listed in other, conditionally speaking, similar markets, such as the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange, the Budapest Stock Exchange, the Sarajevo Stock Exchange, the Ljubljana Stock 
Exchange, etc., and possibly to extend the research subject to all the other listed companies, not 




just blue chip issuers. Moreover, even higher number of markets could be included in the 
analysis, and then the comparison of the final results could be made based on different criteria – 
economic development (developed/developing economies), legal origin classifications by La 
Porta et al. (1997) – English, German, French and Scandinavian origin which determines the 
predominant corporate governance system (one-tier/two-tier system), etc. Moreover, there are 
numerous studies that correlate ownership structure to the corporate governance quality; in 
this thesis companies taken into account generally have concentrated ownership, and therefore 
such comparison among samples cannot be performed. However, if one would take into 
consideration many more other markets, it would be also possible to draw comparison among 
markets that are characterised by predominantly concentrated ownership and those with 
dispersed ownership. Eventually the final goal of this extended research would be to construct 
an index measuring corporate governance on a firm-level worldwide, just as many other indices 
related to different topics, such as the Technology Achievement Index developed by the United 
Nations for the Human Development Report covering 72 countries (United Nations, 2001; 
Fukuda-Parr, 2003), the Index of Economic Freedom published by the Heritage Foundation with 
support of the Wall Street Journal including 184 countries, the Index of a Host Country’s 




























The thesis reveals a lot about corporate governance development in both Czech and Croatian 
markets in the last two decades, which is a precondition for understanding the main research 
subject - firm-level corporate governance of the most liquid companies: Prague Stock Exchange 
companies whose stocks take part in the PX Index and Zagreb Stock Exchange companies 
included in the CROBEX10 Index.  
 
The principal mean of the analysis is a unique Corporate Governance Index, representing a 
contribution to the field of corporate governance studies. Being a composite indicator of firm-
level corporate governance, it is a first trial of measuring governance mechanisms implemented 
in the Czech and Croatian companies to the author's best knowledge. The index concentrates 
solely on the best practices, and thus creates distinction between companies that simply follow 
regulatory requirements, and those that truly strive to catch up with modern corporate 
governance trends and adopt most up-to-date recommendations. Methodology used for its 
construction is based on OECD standards, and the index is tested for consistency in a very 
detailed manner. Its structure is developed by a mathematical aggregation of four sub-indicators 
based on 40 variables and condensed into manageable information sets, which are then further 
condensed into an index. These sub-indicators (sub-indices) reflect the quality of governance in 
the four main domains: board structure and functioning, conflict of interest, shareholders’ rights, 
and transparency and disclosure. Therefore, one of the key advantages of this index is that it is 
composed of different but related sub-indicators, and it enables to comprise various aspects of a 
multifaceted phenomenon such as corporate governance. 
 
Interpretation of the Corporate Governance Index results gives quick overview of the state of 
implemented governance practices in both PX and CROBEX10 companies, so this is powerful, 
“eye-catching” tool for advocacy. The main assumption of this work is that Czech companies 
should have better overall level of corporate governance than the Croatian ones. Indeed, it has 
been demonstrated that the Czech companies have better governance mechanisms at the overall 
level, as well as in the most of the individual domains covered – board, conflict of interest, and 
transparency and disclosure practices. On the other hand, Croatian companies have negligible 
advantage solely in terms of the shareholders' rights practices. 
 




Besides the remarkable results of the present study, there are potential limitations that have to 
be outlined. In the first place, that may be a small sample issue that arose due to the fact that the 
approach followed is based on taking into consideration only the most liquid companies on both 
markets, as these blue chip issuers represent the core of the market and it is worth to observe 
the corporate governance in “living” companies, not in those that are barely traded. Since both 
markets have relatively small number of liquid companies, this issue appeared. Nevertheless, the 
results should be taken as relevant, especially because they are interpreted only at the level of 
the mentioned companies. Another potential limitation might be the fact that majority of the 
Czech companies covered by this research are predominantly in foreign ownership and one may 
think that they in fact represent foreign governance practices. However, this is true only up to a 
certain extent since all of these companies also need to comply with the local corporate 
governance rules and customs. Thus, it should be reliable to track behaviour of such companies 
as an indicator of firm-level corporate governance in the country in question, regardless of their 
owners in this context. 
 
Overall, the study provides strong results on various corporate governance practices 
implementation and additionally, it gives insights on the main drawbacks present both in the 
Czech and Croatian companies’ governance. It can therefore serve as an indicator for policy-
oriented measures addressed in order to diminish or eliminate the problematic areas and make 
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APPENDIX A: Corporate Governance Indices 
 
Table 1: U.S. Governance Index by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
 
Source: Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), adjusted by author 
 
 
Table 2: Korean Corporate Governance Index by Black, Jang and Kim (2003) 
 
Components of the Governance Index 

























Fair Price Cash-Out Law 
Written 
Consent 





 Liability Supermajority Poison Pills Fair Price Law 






Korean Corporate Governance Index 
Shareholder Rights Sub-index 
A.1 Firm uses cumulative voting for election of directors 
A.2 Firm permits voting by mail 
A.3 Firm chooses shareholder meeting to not overlap with other firms in industry, or 
chooses location to encourage attendance 
A.4 Firm discloses director candidates to shareholders in advance of shareholder 
meeting 
A.5 Board approval is required for related party transactions 
Board Structure Sub-index 
B.1 Firm has at least 50% outside directors 
B.2 Firm has more than 50% outside directors. 
B.3 Firm has outside director nominating committee. 
B.4 Firm has audit committee. 
Board Procedure Sub-index 
Elements that apply to all firms 
C.1 Directors attend at least 75% of meetings on average. 
C.2 Directors' positions on board meeting agenda items are recorded in board minutes. 
C.3 CEO and chairman are different people. 
C.4 A system for evaluating directors exists. 
C.5 A bylaw to govern meetings exists. 





Source: Black et al (2003a, 2003b), adjusted by  author 
 
 
Table 3: Thailand Corporate Governance Index by Ananchotikul (2008) 
 
Thailand Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Index 














What is the size of the board of directors? 
What is the size of executive board? 
How many directors are also managers? 
How many directors are "independent"?  
Does the firm state the definition of 
"independence" in the disclosure report?  




1 if 5 <= a1 <=12; 0 otherwise 
1 if a2 <= 12; 0 otherwise 
1 if a3/a1 < 1/3; 0 otherwise 
1 if a4/a1 > 1/3; 0 otherwise 
1 if a5 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 

















C.6 Firm holds four or more regular board meetings per year. 
C.7 Firm has one or more foreign outside directors. 
C.8 Outside directors do not receive retirement pay. 
C.9 Outside directors can obtain advice from outside experts at the company's expense 
C.10 Firm has or plans a system for evaluating outside directors. 
C.11 Shareholders approve outside directors' aggregate pay (separate from shareholder 
approval of all directors' aggregate pay).  
C.12 Outside directors attend at least 75% of meetings on average. 
C.13 Firm has code of conduct for outside directors 
C.14 Firm designates a contact person to support outside directors. 
C.15 Board meeting solely for outside directors exists. 
C.16 Firm has not lent outside directors funds to purchase unsubscribed shares from the 
company. 
D.2 Bylaws governing audit committee (or internal auditor) exist. 
D.4 Audit committee (or internal auditor) recommends the external auditor at the 
annual shareholder meeting. 
D.5 Audit committee (or internal auditor) approves the appointment of the internal 
audit head. 
D.7 Report on audit committee's (or internal auditor's) activities at the annual 
shareholder meeting. 
D.9 Audit committee (or internal auditor) meets with external auditor to review 
financial statements. 
Elements that apply to firms with audit committee 
D.1 Outside directors comprise more than 2/3 of audit committee. 
D.3 Audit committee includes someone with expertise in accounting. 
D.6 Written minutes for audit committee meetings. 
D.8 Audit committee members attend at least 75% of meetings. 
D.10 Audit committee meets two or more times per year. 
Disclosure Sub-index 
E.1 Firm conducted investor relation activity in 2000. 
E.2 Firm website includes resumes of board members 
E.3 English disclosure exists 
Ownership Parity Sub-index 




director training programs by the Thai 















































CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
 
Is the Chairman the same person as the 
CEO? 
Is the Chairman "independent"? 
How many public companies does the 
Chairman concurrently serve as a director 
or a manager? 
Does an audit committee exist? 
  - chaired by independent director? 
  - role and responsibilities clearly stated? 
  - performance or meeting attendance 
disclosed?  
Does a nominating committee exist? 
  - chaired by independent director? 
  - role and responsibilities clearly stated? 
  - performance or meeting attendance 
disclosed? 
Does a remuneration committee exist? 
  - chaired by independent director? 
  - role and responsibilities clearly stated? 
  - performance or meeting attendance 
disclosed? 
Does a corporate governance committee 
exist? 
- chaired by independent director? 
- role and responsibilities clearly stated? 
 - performance or meeting attendance 
disclosed? 
Does the firm have a policy that specifies 
a minimum number of independent 
directors? 
Does the firm discuss the following 
internal-control issues in the disclosure 
report? 
 1) Organizational and control 
environment 
 2) Risk management 
 3) Management control activities 
 4) Information and communication 





1 if b1 = 0; 0 otherwise 
 
1 if b2 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1 if b3 <= 3; 0 otherwise 
 
 
1/2 if b4 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/6 if b5 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/6 if b6 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/6 if b7 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
1/2 if b8 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/6 if b9 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/6 if b10 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/6 if b11 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
1/2 if b12 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/6 if b13 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/6 if b14 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/6 if b15 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
1/2 if b16 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
1/6 if b17 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/6 if b18 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/6 if b19 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 






2/15 if b21 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
2/15 if b22 = 1; 0 otherwise 
2/15 if b23 = 1; 0 otherwise 
2/15 if b24 = 1; 0 otherwise 
















































































Number of board meetings per year 
Average director's meeting attendance 
Average independent director's meeting 
attendance 
Is there a board meeting solely for 
independent directors? 
Number of audit committee meetings per 
year 









1 if c4 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 



















































Is there at least one accounting expert on 
the audit committee? 
How many public companies does the 
chairman of audit committee serve as a 
director or manager? 
Does the firm clearly distinguish the role 
and responsibilities of the board and 
management? 
Does the firm disclose that directors 
evaluation system exists? 
Does the firm have an option scheme 
which incentivizes management? 
Has there been any legal dispute where 
the firm was claimed to be at fault during 
the past year? 
Has there been any sanction to the board, 
management, or other insider(s) for 
violations of Securities and/or 
Corporations laws in the last two years? 3 
 
1 if c7 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
1 if c8 <= 3; 0 otherwise 
 
 
1/3 if c9 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
 
1/3 if c10 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
1/3 if c11 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 


















































Does the firm hold an annual general 
shareholder meeting? 
Does the firm employ one-share-one-vote 
rule? 
Is cumulative voting allowed in electing 
directors? 
Is voting by mail allowed? 
How many days in advance does the firm 
send out a notice of general meetings to 
shareholders? 
Is proxy voting allowed? 
Does the firm disclose a dividend policy? 
What is the minimum dividend (as 
percentage of net profit) according to the 
dividend policy? 
Does the firm provide an 
explanation/rationale for setting dividend 





1 if d1 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
1 if d2 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
1 if d3 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 




1 if d6 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/3 if d7 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/3 * d8/100 
 
 




















































DISCLOSURE & TRANSPARENCY 
 
Does the firm disclose the following 
information in the disclosure report? 
1) Board meeting attendance of  
individual directors 
  2) Board compensation and/or benefits  
       of individual directors 
  3) Director shareholdings 
  4) Management shareholdings 
  5) Related party transactions in details 4 
  6) Corporate group structure 
  7) Groupings of major shareholders who  
       belong to the same family/economic   
       unit 






1 if e1 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
1 if e2 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
1 if e3 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1 if e4 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1 if e5 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1 if e6 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1 if e7 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
 































































Does the firm mention its investor 
relations activity carried out during the 
past year? 
Does company website exist? 
Does company website contain the 
following information? 
  1) Bio of directors 
  2) Business operation 
  3) Financial statements 
  4) Press release 
  5) Shareholding structure 
  6) Organization structure 
  7) Corporate group structure 
  8) Annual Report downloadable 
  9) Up-to-date information 
 10) English version 
Does the firm publish Annual Report in 
English language (in addition to Thai 
language)? 
Does the firm's Annual Report include a 
section devoted to corporate governance 
principles and implementations? 
How many times in the last two years has 
the firm been charged for failures to 
publish company reports within the 
specified period?  
 
1 if e9 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
 
1 if e10 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
 
1/5 if e11 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/5 if e12 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/5 if e13 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/5 if e14 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/5 if e15 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/5 if e16 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/5 if e17 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/5 if e18 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/5 if e19 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1/5 if e20 = 1; 0 otherwise 
1 if e21 = 1; 0 otherwise 
 
 





























* Available only for the year 2004 and thus excluded from CGI 2000 calculations. 
 



















APPENDIX B: The Corporate Governance Questionnaire 
 












What is the ownership structure? 
a) Very concentrated (controlling shareholder who has substantial voting rights and  
effectively controls the firm) 
b) Concentrated (more controlling shareholders) 




If the answer to the question 3. is a) or b), is this controlling shareholder/any of 






Is a certain portion of the company owned by the government?  




What is your position in the company? 
a) Investor Relations official 
b) Company’s Secretary 





2. Board Practices 
 
 








How many members are there in the Management Board? 
 













Is there a balanced (equable) proportion of women and men in terms of their positions as 








Did the company adopt Code of Conduct and Business Ethics?  
 










What is an approximate average director's meeting attendance (in %) for the Supervisory 
Board members? 
10. 
What is an approximate average director's meeting attendance (in %) for the 
Management Board members?  
11. 
Do written meeting minutes exist and do they contain all adopted decisions, accompanied 
by data on voting results, along with information on votes of each individual member?  
 
12. Are there initial and regular trainings for directors? 
13. 
 
Do the Supervisory Board members have the ability to commission independent analysts 
or hire external consultants on company’s expense, if they believe such outside help is 





Did the Supervisory Board formally evaluate their work in the preceding period, including 
evaluation of the contribution and competence of individual members, as well as of joint 




Is the remuneration received by the members of the Supervisory Boards partially 





Is there a long term succession plan in the company?  
 
 
3. Conflict of Interest Practices 
1. 
 








Are there any members of the Supervisory Board that also have functions on boards of 
other companies which are suppliers or customers?  
 
4.  Does an Internal Audit department/function exist? 
5. 
 




Does a Remuneration Committee exist?    
 
7. Does a Nomination committee exist?     
 
4. Shareholders' Rights Practices 
1. 
 
Does the firm employ “one share – one vote” rule? 








Have shareholders been given the opportunity to participate and to vote at the Annual 












Does the firm disclose a dividend policy, and is there an explanation/rationale for setting 




Are the Annual General Meetings attended by members of the Management Board who can 








5. Transparency and Disclosure Practices 
 
 




a) Information on each member of  Boards and Committees member, including biography 




b) Detailed records on all remunerations and other earnings received from the company or 












Is there an English version of the Annual Report? 
 
 




a) Investors' Relations section including corporate governance subsection/information 
7. 
 
b) Analyst Coverage section 
8. 
 
c) Media Relations section 
9. 
 
d) Calendar of corporate events 
10. 
 












APPENDIX C: Benchmarking Criteria for Evaluating Practices 
Promoted by the Corporate Governance Index 
 
This section will provide with benchmarking criteria that were used in the assessment of the 
corporate governance practices applied in the companies covered by this research. Best 
practices from various sources were used, as the idea is to create a unique set of widely applied 
best practice recommendations. 
The reasoning for choosing certain benchmarks will be elaborated solely where that is 
considered as necessary, since there are lot of practices generally advisable to implement 
without any doubt. Moreover, it is important to stress that in terms of certain practices (for 
instance those related to the board size and structure), there is no „one size fits all‟ approach, 
since it is considered to be more effective to allow firms to choose those characteristics that are 
most appropriate for their own needs without weakening underlying economic determinants 
(Guest, 2008). Nevertheless, certain guidelines do exist.  
 
Benchmarks for Board Practices  
Board size: Many authors consider that a smaller board is related to better firm performance 
(Yermack, 1996; Denis & Sarin, 1999) and although there are also some papers proving the 
opposite, much of the public debate has centred on pressure for smaller board size. As a 
benchmark in this assessment, the optimal size of the board in the one-tier structure will be 9 
members and below, as suggested by Guest (2009), who made a research on sample of the U.K. 
companies. When it comes to the two-tier structure, supervisory board should have at maximum 
10 members, as suggested in the Austrian Working Group for Corporate Governance 
recommendations (2005). Since both Czech Republic and Croatia have similar governance 
systems to Austria, this benchmark can be applied. Management board size benchmark is set at 
maximum 7 members, having foundations in Theisen’s (1998) research on average size of the 
German management board, which did not truly change in the recent period.  
Directors’ independence: Among numerous other sources, it is proposed in OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance that a majority of board of directors’ members (one-tier governance 
system) or supervisory board members (two-tier system) should be independent. Chairman of 
the board of directors/supervisory board should be independent. It is also proposed that the 
definition of directors’ independence should be disclosed.  
 




Balanced proportion of men and women in management and supervisory functions: Many 
corporate governance codes, such as Austrian and Dutch, contain such provisions. In its 
document under the title „Strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015“, the 
European Commission particularly promotes equality of genders in decision-making processes. 
Moreover, research shows that gender diversity pays off and that there is a positive correlation 
between women in leadership positions and business performance (EU Commission, 2010). 
 
Board annual meeting frequency: Due to lack of benchmark in literature, the evidence from 
practice was used. For one-tier board, FTSE 100 companies served as a benchmark (the U.K. is 
main jurisdiction in Europe when it comes to one-tier governance system), having 8.7 meetings 
on average per year (Grant Thornton, 2011). Therefore, the benchmark on number of one-tier 
board meetings used in this work will be 8 meetings per year. Two-tier board benchmarks are 
taken from the Czech Code of Corporate Governance (2004): supervisory board should meet at 
least four times per year while management board should meet at least once a month. 
 
The composition of the remuneration to the supervisory board members /non-executive 
members of the board of directors: Remuneration shall consist of a fixed part, which does not 
depend on operating results (unless operating results show that the payment of fixed 
remuneration would be undeserved and in great disproportion with operating results), and of a 
variable part, which depends on operating results during a certain past or future period 
(Croatian Corporate Governance Code, 2007). This is widely promoted practice, being present in 
the majority of national codes adhering to OECD guidelines, such as Czech, Dutch, Austrian, etc. 
 
The supervisory board/board of directors shall ensure that there is a long-term succession 
plan: This enables a prudent and timely appointment of a successor to any of the members of 
the company’s management (Croatian Corporate Governance Code, 2007).  
 
Benchmarks for Conflict of Interest Practices 
 
Board committees: These are governing bodies usually performing audit, nomination and 
remuneration functions, but there are also other functions they can cover. The methodological 
issue of putting board committee practices under Conflict of Interest Sub-index is taken from 
Ananchotikul (2008). This is fairly straightforward since delegating certain functions to the 
board member groups contributes to providing more dispersed decision making process 
regarding various issues. Besides, responsibilities delegated to committees are then held by 
smaller group of directors who can specialise and continuously focus on certain domains to 
provide better judgement, while board is still the main authority and keeps its integrity.  




Benchmarks for Shareholders’ Rights Practices 
 
“One share – one vote” principle: The voting right shall cover all the shareholders of the 
company so as to make the number of the votes belonging to them in the general assembly equal 
to the number of the shares they hold, regardless of the class of shares (Croatian Code of 
Corporate Governance, 2007). In the case where the company issues non-voting shares or shares 
with limitations on voting rights, it shall publish in a timely manner all relevant data on the 
content of all rights resulting from such shares in order to enable investors to make the right 
decision related to the purchase of these financial instruments (Croatian Code of Corporate 
Governance, 2007). 
 
Proxy Voting: In general, no procedures may be adopted that would practically prevent or limit 
the exercise of the shareholders' rights. Shareholders must be able to vote in person or in 
absentia, and equal effect should be given to both types of votes. Therefore, prohibitions of 
proxy voting and the requirement of personal attendance at general shareholder meetings to 
vote should not be permitted (Czech Code of Corporate Governance, OECD). 
 
Voting using modern technologies: The European Union Shareholders’ Rights Directive (2007) 
requires that members of publicly traded companies have the possibility to participate in 
general meetings and exercise their voting rights electronically. Therefore, these companies 
should provide the required electronic mechanisms for such voting practices and establish real 
time transmission of the meeting.  
Cumulative voting in electing directors: It is often seen as one of the major mechanisms that 
can help equalise shareholder rights. This question appears also in most literature with the same 
research subject, and some of the authors that refer to it are Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), 
Black, Jang and Kim (2003a, 2003b) and Ananchotikul (2008). 
 
Benchmarks for Transparency and Disclosure Practices  
 
Some of the questions are best practice guidelines from OECD codes, such as annual report 
contents: information on boards members, records on their remunerations, statement on the 
compliance and departure from the corporate governance code, etc.; and web page contents: 
Investor Relations section including corporate governance subsection/information, General 
meetings section/subsection with up-to-date information, etc. The other supplementary 
contents are taken from practice, i.e. some of the most transparent companies' annual reports 
and web pages were examined and the recommendations were drawn respectively. 
